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State practice, treaty practice and State immunity
in international and English law
alexander orakhelashvili
1. Introduction: State immunity at the crossroads of the
fragmentation discourse
Approaching State immunity from the perspective of the fragmenta-
tion versus convergence debate requires concentrating on whether, under
international law, there is one single legal regime applicable to immuni-
ties or a multitude of normative regimes. This relates, in the first place, to
the relationship between the immunity of States and of their officials. In
principle, State officials can claim immunity abroad solely because their
own State would be entitled to a coterminous immunity. If the official’s
immunitywere different and invocable on a separate basis, the Statewould
have no claim to raise if immunity were to be denied, nor could it waive
that immunity for the official. In such case it would not be the State’s
immunity in the first place, but instead represent a kind of individual
right. There is, anyway, no evidence in practice that such separate official
immunity is recognised as a free-standing category.1
The next issue relates to immunities in civil and criminal proceed-
ings. In relation to criminal proceedings, the International Law Commis-
sion (ILC) Special Rapporteur, Kolodkin, has suggested that ‘State offi-
cials enjoy immunity ratione materiae from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
1 This issue arises in relation to particular treaty regimes as well. Article 1(b)(iv) of the 2004
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property equates State
representatives acting in that capacity to the State, though it may be open to question
whether ‘acting in that capacity’ means being de facto at the service of the State or carrying
out the function that is inherently and uniquely associated with the sovereign authority of
that State. This point is generically similar to that arising under CAT 1984, on which see
section 4 below.
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i.e. immunity in respect of acts performed in an official capacity, since
these acts are acts of the State which they serve itself.’2 Again, such mul-
tiple terminology confuses the matter, for it becomes unclear whether,
for the purposes of immunity, we need to focus on the nature of the act
as such, the capacity in which that act was performed, or the broader
purpose and interests served by the performance of that act; whether the
acts in question should be ‘acts of the State which they serve’, or acts that
fall within the sovereign authority of the State. This question is crucial
for immunities in both criminal and civil proceedings (apart from the
limited category of ratione personae immunities of a very limited num-
ber of high-ranking officials, premised on the constitutional position of
those officials, as opposed to the nature of the act immunity is claimed
for).
The difference between civil and criminal immunities has been main-
tained by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v. UK,3 the
UK House of Lords in Jones v. Saudi Arabia,4 subsequently approved by
the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights,5 and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Germany v. Italy,6 which have all
upheld State immunity for serious human rights violations and for inter-
national crimes. Moses LJ has similarly suggested in the case of Khurts
Bat that ‘[i]t does not follow that because there is immunity from civil
suit, an individual, acting as an official on behalf of his State, is immune
from criminal liability’.7
Courts have not worked any uniform rationale for this projected dis-
tinction. In some cases it is put forward at the level of the scope of acts
jure imperii, while in other cases, notably in Al-Adsani, it is argued at
the level of the effect of jus cogens. The distinction is certainly popular in
some doctrinal circles, but is by nomeans generally accepted. The Second
Report of the ILC Special Rapporteur falls short of subscribing to such
distinction. From the other end of the doctrinal spectrum, the Institute
of International Law has emphasised in the 2009 Naples Resolution that
2 Second Report, RA Kolodkin, A/CN.4/631, 10 June 2010, para. 94.
3 Al-Adsani v. UK, 34 EHRR 11(2002).
4 Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 16, 14 June 2006.
5 Jones and Others v. The United Kingdom, Nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, Fourth Section, 14
January 2014.
6 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), International
Court of Justice, Judgment of 3 February 2012, General List No. 143, esp. para. 87.
7 Khurts Bat v. Mongolia, High Court [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin), 29 July 2011, para. 74.
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the criminality of the conduct of a State official should lead to the denial
of their immunities in civil proceedings.8
A further relevant issue touches upon the sources of law on the basis of
which particular judicial decisions are adopted. It may be empirically true
that various sources of law can establish different regimes for criminal and
civil immunities of States and their officials. For instance, as US Supreme
Court has clarified in Samantar, that the 1976 US Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) does not apply to State officials.9 It only covers
situations where the foreign State is directly impleaded before American
courts. The FSIA and the 1978 UK State Immunity Act (SIA) do not
extend to criminal proceedings either. The same holds true for the 1972
European Convention on State Immunity (ECSI) and the above 2004 UN
Convention, if and when it enters into force.
But these are merely situational and empirical differences that do not
go to the underlying rationale of immunities, whether that of a State or of
an official, whether civil or criminal. In common law systems, legislation
displaces the pre-existing common law that incorporates international
law.Cases not coveredby the statute are subjected to substantially different
criteria, as was the case in the decisions of English courts in Lampen-
Wolfe and Littrell.10 Similarly, Samantar would be differently decided by
American courts whether it were based on the FSIA, or on common law
as the Supreme Court said it should be.
Internationally, if the relevant treaty in force applies in casu and inter
se, it will apply as lex specialis. If it is not in force, or the case falls
outside its reach ratione personaeor rationemateriae, general international
law will apply – again with the possibility of furnishing the outcomes
substantially different from ones that could be maintained under the
treaties.
With these considerations in mind, the present chapter will first exam-
ine the merit of the restrictive doctrine of immunities, its application in
criminal and civil proceedings, and its place in customary international
law (Section 2). Section 3 will examine the existing or nascent treaty
regimes on immunities. Section 4 will focus on the impact of human
rights treaties on immunities, notably the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and the 1984 UN Convention against Torture
8 Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in case
of International Crimes, IDI, Naples Session, 2009.
9 Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08–1555, 1 June 2010.
10 Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 3 All ER 845–6; Littrell v. USA [1995] 1 WLR 182.
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(CAT). Section 5 will focus on the impact of normative hierarchy exam-
ining, in turn, jurisdictional arrangements under Articles 5, 7 and 14
CAT, and jus cogens. Section 6 will examine the extent to which the legal
position under the international law on immunities could be received and
given effect in English law. Section 7 will offer general conclusions.
The methodology chosen here relies on consensual positivism,
premised on ordinary sources of international law, whether or not they
reflect the political naturalist perspective as to the sensibility or desir-
ability of granting or denying immunity, or to fears as to some adverse
consequences that the denial of immunities is likely to entail. But as the
debate is, informally at least, influenced by cliche´s and pre-conceptions
that the pro-immunity position should be privileged as the right and cor-
rect one in maintaining stability and avoiding chaos, section 6 will also
examine how English courts are supposed to deal with the relevant policy
considerations.
2. The place of the restrictive doctrine of immunities in
international law
A. Statement of the problem
First and foremost, we need to understand what shape of the immunity
doctrine is exactly deemed or pretended to be part of customary interna-
tional law. Both the House of Lords in Jones and the ICJ in Germany v.
Italy have asserted this to be the ‘restrictive’ doctrine that excludes com-
mercial acts but immunises violations of human rights and humanitarian
law. This section will demonstrate that the position that such general
rule of immunity exists under international law, from which a specific
exception related to human rights or international crimes must then be
identified, constitutes a fallacy. This is a view that can help reach some
politically desirable outcomes, but not one that reflects the actual state of
current positive international law.
The ICJ acknowledged in Germany v. Italy that the existence of opinio
juris in the area of State immunity requires ‘the acknowledgment, by
States granting immunity, that international law imposes upon them an
obligation to do so’. The Court further asserted that ‘States generally
proceed on the basis that there is a right to immunity under international
law, together with a corresponding obligation on the part of other States
to respect and give effect to that immunity.’11 This is, as we shall see below,
11 Germany v. Italy, para. 56.
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a questionable thesis, because there is plenty of practice through which
States deny the existence of customary rule on immunities, whether of
foreign States or of their officials.
B. The scope of the relevant practice
What is the evidence that the ‘restrictive’ immunity along the above lines
is part of customary international law? Without this being the case, any
doctrine of immunities could only be an analytical rationalisation at the
level of lex ferenda, on which phenomenon the International Court has
clearly, and repeatedly, maintained the position that it cannot serve as the
basis of its decisions.12
The issue could only be clarified through the focus on the relevant
State practice. Moses LJ suggested in Khurts Bat that the practice through
which ‘States have not claimed immunity is just as much evidence of
the absence of State practice as those cases where immunity is claimed
but denied by the forum state.’13 But cases in which States do not claim
immunity contribute hardly anything to the development of State practice
on immunities and must, for that reason, be excluded from the focus. It
is in the essence of immunities that States can freely choose whether or
not to claim them; not claiming immunities in a particular case does not
prejudice the possibility of doing so in a later case. Only State practice that
positively addresses the rationale and scope of immunities must count for
ascertaining what the applicable international law is.
To illustrate, and despite suggestions in writings,14 State practice
regarding the prosecution of individuals for espionage, acting at the ser-
vice of their States, contributes precious little to the practice on State
immunity, unless it were to be demonstrated that the relevant agent was
tried domestically even if its State of nationality claimed their immunity.
The ILC Special Rapporteur suggested that it is difficult for the State to
assert immunity for acts of espionage, kidnapping and sabotage commit-
ted on the territory of another State.15 But this is not because there is
any firm rule of international law preventing States from doing so, but
because doing so would publicly and effectively associate the State with
12 Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland) Merits, ICJ Reports 1974, 23–4; Libya v. Malta, ICJ
Reports, 1982, 38.
13 Khurts Bat, para. 99.
14 See, e.g., A. Sanger, ‘Immunity of State Officials from the Criminal Jurisdiction of a
Foreign State’, (2013) 62 ICLQ, 193, 212–13.
15 Second Report, para. 85.
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those activities,16 especially in cases where the prosecution can support
its case with the plausible evidence.
C. The general essence of the restrictive doctrine
It is generally established in international law that, to identify a customary
rule on any subject-matter, we have to identify a point in time by which
this rule has crystallised through practice. The rights and obligations of
States on the relevant subject-matter would, then, be different before and
after that point of time.17 It must be emphasised that neither the House
of Lords in Jones nor the ICJ in Germany v. Italy have concentrated on
this temporal element to show as of which point in time the ‘restrictive’
approach they upheld has become part of customary law and thus binding
on the relevant States.
Historically, the restrictive doctrine was first developed in relation to
civil proceedings. By the time State practice took up the criminal pro-
ceedings aspect, the legal position as to the scope of jure imperii acts was
relatively well established as covering only acts unique to State authority.
The public policy dimension based on jus cogens or international crimi-
nality of the underlying conduct has come to State practice considerably
later, with the American cases of Letelier andMarcos and the English case
of Pinochet. This latter sub-area does not offer any alternative or a quali-
tatively new test. It brings moral and ethical dimension to what is already
obvious – these acts are anyway of such nature that they do not require
the exercise of State authority for their perpetration.
The absolute immunity doctrine, that was deemed to be in force for
a long time right up to the mid-twentieth century, enabled States and
their officials to evade foreign proceedings merely on the basis of their
identity.18 Lord Wright suggested in the Cristina case in the House of
Lords that, pursuant to the absolute immunity rule the State:
renounces pro tanto the competence of its Courts to exercise their juris-
diction even over matters occurring within its territorial limits, though to
do so is prima facie an integral part of sovereignty. The rule may be said
16 Cf., France v. Djibouti, ICJ Reports 2008, para. 196.
17 For the ICJ’s jurisprudence on this point see Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (UK v. Norway),
ICJ Reports, 1951, 116; The Minquiers and Echrehos Case (France v. UK), ICJ Reports,
1953, 47.
18 Sometimes this has assumed anecdotal dimensions. See, e.g. Mighell v. Sultan of Johore
[1894] QB 149, to the effect that immunities could preclude litigation as to the breach of
the promise to marry. The outcome was ‘a consequence of the absolute independence of
every sovereign authority’.
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to be based on the principle ‘par in parem non habet imperium,’ no State
can claim jurisdiction over another sovereign State. . . . Or it may be taken
to flow from reciprocity, each sovereign State within the community of
nations accepting some subtraction from its full sovereignty in return for
similar concessions on the side of the others.19
Each State was thus expected to give as much as it would receive. The
rule that went by the identity of the defendant rather than the nature of
the act made this easier. The par in parem rule, denying jurisdiction of
an equal over an equal was therefore an essential premise for the absolute
immunity rule.
The restrictive doctrine of immunity requires that the defendant State
and its officials additionally demonstrate that their conduct was per-
formed in the exercise of their governmental authority. The judicial
endorsement of the restrictive doctrine took place in the Empire of Iran
case by the German Constitutional Court, suggesting that the distinction
between sovereign and non-sovereign acts does not depend ‘on whether
the State has acted commercially. Commercial activities of States are not
different in their nature from other non-sovereign State activities.’ What
mattered was the nature of the transaction rather than its underlying
motive and policy, whether the State acted in the exercise of its sovereign
authority or in a private capacity the way that any private person could
act.20
This approach was later on more comprehensively adopted by the
House of Lords in the cases of Trendtex21 and Congreso. The House of
Lords held in the latter case that the conduct of a State is not a sovereign
act and attracts no immunity if it is an act which could be performed
by any private actor, even if the situation related to a highly contingent
political context.22 A similar approach was voiced by the US Judiciary
in the aftermath of the 1952 Tate Letter that inaugurated the restrictive
doctrine in the US. In the Victory Transport case, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit clearly observed that:
Sovereign immunity is a derogation from the normal exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the courts and should be accorded only in clear cases . . . fall[ing]
within one of the categories of strictly political or public acts . . . :
19 Cristina [1938]AC 485 at 502–503; LordMaugham also approved ‘insisting as a condition
of immunity on the adherence of other foreign Governments to the same rule as to
immunity’, ibid., 518.
20 Empire of Iran, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 30 April 1963, 45 ILR 57 at 80.
21 Trendtex Trading v. Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529, 552–3.
22 I Congreso del Partido (HL) [1983] I AC 268.
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(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien.
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization.
(3) acts concerning the armed forces.
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity.
(5) public loans
Wedonot think that the restrictive theory adoptedby the StateDepartment
requires sacrificing the interests of private litigants to international comity
in other than these limited categories.23
A comparable list of sovereign activities was included in the resolution of
the Institute of International Law adopted at the proposal of the Special
Rapporteur Ian Brownlie.24
The further application of the restrictive doctrine by English courts,
such as in cases of Lampen-Wolfe and Littrell,25 was concerned with the
activities of foreign armed forces, has followed theCongreso approach, and
focused on the nature of the relevant act in the underlying context, rather
than it having been authored by armed forces as such, in determining
whether immunity should be accorded. The Congreso approach was also
carefully followed in Kuwait Air Co where the governmental authority
test was applied to the sequence of acts that were undertaken by public
bodies of the foreign State.26 By and large, then, various jurisdictions have
been uniform in applying that pattern of the restrictive doctrine. Its basic
essence is that an act that anyone can perform is not one that is unique
to State authority (jure imperii).
Overall, the restrictive doctrine does not require identifying an excep-
tion from the generally applicable immunity. Instead, it requires a careful
focus on the nature of each and every relevant act. Rather clear ways of
articulating the merit of the restrictive doctrine have been suggested in
various areas. In relation to acts of armed forces, the authorship of those
acts by armed forces is not sufficient; their nature and relationship must
be further assessed. There is a clear distinction between activities within
the foreign military base, directly serving the need to maintain the base
and, say, their use as a contract workforce or a tool for atrocities (as was
the case in Germany v. Italy below). There is a difference between own-
ership and control of natural resources by the State and trade in the very
23 Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General 336 F.2d 354 (1964), para. 10.
24 Contemporary Problems Concerning the Immunity of States in Relation to Questions of
Jurisdiction and Enforcement, IDI Basel Session, 1991, Article 2(3).
25 Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 3 All ER 845–6; Littrell v. USA [1995] 1 WLR 182.
26 Kuwait Air Co, Court of Appeal [1995] WLR 1147, 1162–3 (per Lord Goff).
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same resources.27 There is, similarly, a difference between the organisa-
tional policy underlying the arrangement of a foreign embassy that falls
within the area of sovereignty and may attract sovereign immunity, and
a more specific issue of the Embassy’s compliance with the employee’s
contractual rights, which may not.28
If this approach is followed, it becomes obvious that serious human
rights violations do not fall into the category of sovereign acts, and there is
nothing that affiliates them with the essence of sovereign power. Human
rights violations meet the criteria repeatedly articulated in jurisprudence
that anyone could commit those acts.29 This runs into Lord Hope’s point
in Pinochet about ‘criminal acts which the head of State did under the
colourof his authority as headof State butwhichwere in reality for his own
pleasure or benefit’ not being immune.30 These acts may be committed
by public authorities, often in pursuing what they perceive as public and
political interest. But the inherent nature of these acts remains the same:
whether a single instance or on a mass scale, their performance does not
inevitably require the use of public authority. The crucial distinction is,
again, between performance of the act by the State and its officials and the
same act being performed as an exercise of public authority. There is no
absolute overlap between the two.
Moreover, in Letelier, Chile contended that assassination of a former
ambassador by a car bomb, even if committed or ordered by the Chilean
government, was an act jure imperii, as an act of ‘policy judgment and
decision’, and immunised under the US legislation. The court responded
that ‘whatever policy options may exist for a foreign country, it has no
“discretion” toperpetrate conduct designated to result in the assassination
of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the
precepts recognised in both national and international law’.31
Obviously, cases decided by English and American courts on the basis
of the SIA and the FSIA could not apply this restrictive doctrine because
27 For the overview of the American jurisprudence, see G. R. Delaume, ‘Economic Develop-
ment and Sovereign Immunity’, 79 AJIL (1985), 319 at 325, 327.
28 Fogarty v. UK, 37112/97, 21 November 2001, paras. 22, 30, 38.
29 For criminal proceedings see Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Burgenthal, Arrest Warrant, ICJ Reports 2002, paras. 74 and 85; for civil litigation see
Hilao v. Marcos, US Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit), 104 ILR 122–5; these violations
were ‘as adjudicable and redressable as would be a dictator’s act of rape’.
30 [2000] 1 AC 242.
31 Letelier, 63 ILR 378 at 388. Chile considered that the act involved was immune under
section 1605 of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976.
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the latter, as embodied in common law that incorporates international
law, was displaced, in those jurisdictions, by the statute that prescribes
that a general immunity persists unless a specific exception from it is
identified.32 The distinction between the sources of national and inter-
national law is indeed cardinal, yet not always properly understood or
acknowledged in the relevant jurisprudence. Thus the Fourth Chamber
of the European Court in Jones v. UK has referred to national court
pronouncements to the effect that a general rule of international law
according immunity to State officials for torture – the same way as to
States – can be identified because the national legislation extends such
immunity to them.33 On other occasions, this elementary distinction
between national and international law has been more properly grasped.
To illustrate, American courts accept that ‘as a matter of international
and domestic law, jus cogens violations are, by definition, acts that are not
officially authorized by the Sovereign’,34 even if the letter of domestic leg-
islation can prevent them from applying this position domestically. This
way, the position in Siderman reaching out to international law directly
can be a valid instance of State practice theway that several other decisions
constrained by national statutes could never be.
This is, however, a purely domestic legal position adopted by the
national legislator; there is no evidence whatsoever that it is reflected
in customary international law agreed upon as between States. This is
the case, contrary to the perception expressed in writings that, after the
adoption of the SIA in the UK, the jurisprudence that relies on the restric-
tive doctrine as part of common (and of international) law could now
be accorded only historical significance.35 In practice, when English and
American courts get a chance to adjudicate outside the SIA, they follow
a limited functional approach referring to the uniqueness of the act to
32 As reflected in the argument put forward by J. Crawford, ‘A Foreign State Immunities Act
for Australia?’ (1983) Australian YIL 71, 105–6. See further notes 122 and 130 and the
accompanying text below.
33 Jones v. UK, paras. 203, 210; moreover, the US, British and Dutch practice (Samantar,
Pinochet and Bouterse) referred to in paras. 211–12 indicated that the pro-immunity
position was not sustainable, yet the Court chose to disregard this practice on the basis of
the House of Lords’ decision in Jones v. Saudi Arabia – the very decision that was being
appealed.
34 Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 718, as followed in Samantar, No. 11-1479, 2 November
2012, 19.
35 As put forward earlier on by F. A. Mann, ‘The State Immunity Act 1978’, (1980) 51 BYIL,
43; and later on in Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale and Sarah Williams, Cases and
Materials on International Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), 318.
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sovereign authority as per Congreso, further applied in Kuwait Air Co,
Littrell and Lampen-Wolfe, and by the US Supreme Court and the Fourth
Circuit Appeals Court in Samantar; as well as earlier in Marcos and Lete-
lier.
The flipside is that the practice of national courts based on the SIA
and the FSIA that require adjudication on immunity issues solely on
the basis of national (as opposed to international) law, and regardless
of the examination of the nature of underlying acts,36 cannot validly
constitute State practice that could build customary law on the subject.
That which excludes international law from the consideration by national
courts, cannot feasibly contribute to the development of the very same
international law.
D. Restrictive doctrine and criminal proceedings
In this area, the decision by the House of Lords in Pinochet was the
first major material case. The acts of torture as prohibited by CAT, by
a jus cogens norm, and as constituting an international crime, did not
amount to the sovereign function of any public official.37 It is impor-
tant to understand that the House of Lords did not establish the lack
of criminal immunity by focusing on the previous practice of domestic
criminal prosecutions of foreign officials, because that previous practice
was not concerned with immunity and its restrictive doctrine. There was
no pre-existing law applicable to criminal immunities alone and such was
not identified. The lack of immunity was established through the appli-
cation of pre-existing functional restrictive doctrine, now to criminal
cases.
The importance of this approach for getting the right resultwas demon-
strated by theway immunitieswere handled in theKhurts Bat case later on.
Moses LJ referred to the ILC Special Rapporteur to deny that immunity
was available in criminal proceedings.38 However, on a general plane, the
Special Rapporteur was of the view that: ‘various rationales for exceptions
to the immunity of officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction prove upon
close scrutiny to be insufficiently convincing. These rationales continue
to be discussed in the doctrine. The practice of States is also far from being
uniform in this respect’; and that: ‘[i]t is difficult to talk of exceptions
to immunity as a norm of international law that has developed, in the
36 As happened in the cases at note 126 below. 37 Pinochet III, (HL), [2000] 1 AC 147.
38 Khurts Bat, para. 99.
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same way as it cannot definitively be asserted that a trend towards the
establishment of such a norm exists’.39
And in relation to criminal immunities alone, the Special Rapporteur
is perfectly right. There is, quite simply, not enough State practice out
there to demonstrate the rule that confers immunity to foreign officials or
denies that immunity in relation to criminal proceedings specifically. Nor
can it be reinforced by practice of prosecution and exercise of jurisdiction
over individuals serving the State where immunity was neither invoked
nor denied. But the Special Rapporteur’s approach is methodologically
erroneous for taking criminal immunities as a separate area and thus
only focusing on the part of the area in which State practice regarding
immunities is displayed. The Special Rapporteur did not properly focus
on the general rationale of immunities that derives from the nature of
sovereign authority of States and the scope of this authority – which is by
definition the same for both criminal and civil proceedings, in principle
as well as in practice.
E. Upholding State immunity through the misapplication of the
restrictive doctrine
Courts that have upheld State immunity for serious violations of human
rights and humanitarian law have initially professed to follow the restric-
tive doctrine. But its treatment differs in each particular case. The Euro-
pean Court in Al-Adsani has provided no explanation as to the nature of
the relevant acts of torture. Itmerely referred to the immunity that Kuwait
enjoyed due to the maxim par in parem non habet imperium, and consid-
ered this sufficient to prevent the victims from invoking their right to the
access to a court under Article 6 ECHR. This way, the European Court
has effectively used the absolute immunity approach that does not prop-
erly query into and distinguish between the sovereign and non-sovereign
acts.
Twelve years later, in Jones v.UK, the Fourth Chamber of the European
Court has not provided any more substantiated explanation of the ratio-
nale and basis of State immunity than its derivation from the sovereignty
of States either.40 The issue of how the rule of immunity propagated in
Al-Adsani and Jones has emerged and achieved binding force through
State practice still remains unclarified.
39 Second Report, at 30, para. 96. 40 Jones v. UK, para. 188.
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In Jones v. Saudi Arabia, the House of Lords have specified that the
individual defendants allegedly responsible for the acts of torture were
public officials, and torture took place in police or on prison premises.
Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffmann also referred to Articles 4 and 7 of
the 2001 ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, according to which the
conduct of whatever organ of the State, including the ones committed
in the excess of instructions or authority, are attributable to the State.41
This has confused State responsibility with State immunity. In reality,
there is some way between the act being performed through the exercise
of State authority or facilities, and the same act being by its nature a
sovereign act. For, if the mere fact of the involvement of public officials
and premises were to be enough, the absolute immunity doctrine would
be re-introduced through the backdoor, making it impossible to exclude
even commercial acts from the scope of immunities if they are perpetrated
by State officials or through the use of State premises or facilities.
The ICJ in Germany v. Italy has queried ‘whether the [war crimes]
in question fall to be assessed by reference to the law governing the
exercise of sovereign power (jus imperii) or the law concerning non-
sovereign activities of a State, especially private and commercial activities
(jus gestionis)’.42 Obviously that has to be international law, not national
law.Otherwise each Statewill be able tounilaterally determine the scopeof
its own internationally opposable immunities. The Court did not explain
what the ‘law governing the exercise of sovereign power’ was, whether
it meant the Third Reich law or international law, or how war crimes
in international law could attract immunity as valid exercises of public
authority.43 Instead, theCourt reliedon the concessionmadeby the Italian
government that these acts were jure imperii acts. As the judgment did not
properly examine the reasons for or against this position, its continuing
value for the development of the law on thismatter is doubtful. Effectively,
as Xiaodong Yang has demonstrated, the Court’s reasoning has upheld
the absolute immunity doctrine in relation to underlying war crimes.44
The International Court’s analysis focused on three separate, albeit
somewhat interdependent questions: torts committed within the forum’s
41 Jones (HL), paras. 11–12 (per Lord Bingham), 76 (per Lord Hoffmann).
42 Germany v. Italy, para. 60.
43 Which obviously is not the same as being lawful, but that is far from being crucial. Legality
of the act and its reflection of public authority can be two separate substantial tests that
may at times overlap in content, but do not have to do so.
44 X. Yang, ‘Absolute Immunity of Foreign Armed Forces from Tort Proceedings’, (2012) 71
CLJ, 282.
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territory; acts committed by armed forces; and the scope of acts jure
imperii. When focusing on the practice related to acts of armed forces,
the Court’s inference was that these attract immunity as far as they are
jure imperii.45 Having essentially acknowledged the two-tiered nature of
the problem – acts of armed forces and their performance as part of
sovereign authority – the Court did not really address the second aspect,
relying instead on the Italian concession.
When confronted with the reality that most of the national practices
deny immunity for territorial torts, either generally or in conjunction
with the acts of armed forces, the Court simply pleaded its unawareness
that those statutory provisions have been applied by national courts to
that effect; and has then recast the issue of tort immunity into that of
armed forces immunity.46 This is a rather curious way of excluding from
the focus the practice that stood in the way of the desired outcome.
The Court then turned to another part of – rather limited – practice
that dealt with the conduct of armed forces during an armed conflict.47
What makes this odd is the inference, on the basis of judicial decisions
adopted in a small number of States,48 that the conduct performed during
an armed conflict provides, under customary international law, a separate
basis, distinct from the territorial tort issue, on which immunities can be
accorded or denied; and that anything armed forces do during an armed
conflict is immune.49 The restrictive doctrine to which the Court initially
alluded was supposed to apply, making immunities dependent on the
sovereign nature of the relevant act in each pertinent case. If the context
of the occurrence of the act, not the nature of the act, were crucial, then
anything committed during an armed conflict – or for that matter in
prisons or other official facilities – would be a sovereign act and immune.
We call that the absolute immunity doctrine.
To compare, both the Lampen-Wolfe and Littrell cases drew on the
relevant acts as part undertaken within the military base and solely for
45 Germany v. Italy, para. 72. 46 Germany v. Italy, paras. 70–7. 47 Ibid., paras. 73–4.
48 It should be noted that in Jones v.UK the same range of limited State practice was alluded
to for demonstrating the shape of a generally binding rule on immunity, see Jones v. UK,
paras. 112–49. The Court does not seem to be using this practice to actually justify its own
position in the operative reasoning of its Judgment.
49 A related point could be that even if the International Court’s approach on acts committed
in war are ipso jure immune, that would still not affect the position that the bulk of cases
not dealing with acts committed in an armed conflict should still be excluded from
immunity. From the national courts’ perspective, the reasoning inGermany v. Italy cannot
be a direct legitimation of Al-Adsani or Jones.
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the purpose of organising and maintaining armed forces, as opposed to
more far-reaching activities affecting the civilian population. By contrast,
the International Court in Germany v. Italy merely relied on the fact that
the relevant acts were authored by German armed forces, as opposed
to these acts validly serving their organising and maintenance purposes.
Only the State can performacts related to organising its own armed forces,
which is a sovereign affair. The use of armed forces to commit crimes for
which sovereign authority is not inherently needed does not, however,
transform these crimes into sovereign acts. This becomes obvious if we
bear in mind the above-mentioned rationale of the restrictive doctrine:
the task is not to clarify whether human rights claims fall within a pre-
determined – commercial or other – exception, but to assess each act on
its own merit to see whether it was undertaken in the genuine exercise of
sovereign authority in the first place.
To summarise, the three above cases did not properly address the
actual State practice, or have engaged in voluntarist reclassification of
what practice was needed and what was not. Apart from the lack of the
uniform approach, these three cases convey the impression as if there
were two different standards to identify acts jure imperii, one applying to
human rights claims and the other to the rest of the cases. This position
does not represent the restrictive doctrine and thus the current legal
position. The only remaining alternative that could reflect the proper
legal position consists in carefully and accurately examining the nature of
underlying acts and transactions in every pertinent case, to see whether –
over and above having been perpetrated by State agents, in public interest
or through the use of State facilities – they constitute valid exercises of
sovereignty and public authority, instead of relying on the outdated par
in parem maxim.
Relying on the principle of sovereign equality and on the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium in Germany v. Italy, Jones v. UK and
Al-Adsani essentiallymisconstrues the restrictive theory andmisdirect the
reasoning as to how the parameters of the restrictive immunity rule must
be identified. If the broad range of commercial, tort and employment
matters is considered, one State could indeed, and frequently, exercise
its imperium over another. The principle of sovereign equality does pre-
cious little to upset this result. Two States would be equal if they can be
impleaded before each other’s courts just as they would be if they cannot
be so impleaded, as long as the underlying legal position applies to them
equally.
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F. State practice and customary law in the balance
The question now arising is whether and to what extent the restrictive
rule in general, or in the shape as propagated in Al-Adsani, Jones (HL),
Germany v. Italy or Jones v. UK could be said to be part of positive
customary international law. The rule thus construed is too nuanced. It
refers to certain kinds of acts being included and others being excluded
from the scope of sovereign immunity. Its conceptual justification is not
as uniform or straightforward as was the case with the absolute immunity
rule. Asserting the customary law status of such a rule thus presumes
a substantially more complex legal position than would be presumed
with regard to the older absolute immunity rule. It therefore requires
a higher threshold of evidence to be cleared in order to identify that
the rule of immunity thus shaped is what has been accepted as part of
positive international law, beingbackedbyState practice that is sufficiently
uniform and consistent, and further supplemented by the requisite opinio
juris.50
This requirement of a higher threshold is further dictated by the aspect
of normativity. Under the restrictive doctrine, immunity could only be
granted or denied under reference rules, not by substantive rules of con-
duct. Substantive rules prescribe, clearly and straightforwardly, the rele-
vant right or obligation. Reference rules merely specify the criteria, the
application of which will ultimately determine what the relevant rights
and obligations are. Given that the requirement of the restrictive doctrine
is to further look at the precise nature of the relevant act and transac-
tion, the conclusion follows that immunities could at most be seen to be
governed by reference rules.
Therefore, in terms of customary law, the higher burden of proof
requires answering the question in relation to what element of that ref-
erence rule should the uniform or consistent State practice be identified:
the general existence of the immunity rule; a particular conception of the
sovereign act; or specific individual acts covered by immunity? And as
it happens, States are not to the least agreed in relation to any of those
criteria. The ICJ decision inGermany v. Italy only demonstrates that State
practice supporting any aspect of the putative rule – sovereign nature of
the act, act by armed forces or the territorial tort aspect – is very limited
and thus qualitatively insufficient.
50 See generally Article 38 of the International Court’s Statute; and North Sea Continental
Shelf, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3.
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Concerns this insufficiency of evidence raises are further corrobo-
rated by further State practice. To illustrate, the United States of America
does not subscribe to such version of the ‘restrictive’ theory as has been
expounded in the cases of Al-Adsani, Jones and Germany v. Italy. The
US Congress has repeatedly amended the FSIA to enable the victims of
terrorist attacks to recover damages from the relevant States;51 and, more
recently, Canada followed suit after the International Court delivered its
judgment inGermany v. Italy.52 This confirms that these two States do not
feel internationally bound to grant immunity to foreign States, let alone
subscribe to a particular vision of immunities that has been upheld in
the Al-Adsani/Jones/Germany v. Italy stream of litigation. More broadly,
American courts have emphasised that ‘the grant of immunity is a privi-
lege which the United States may withhold from any claimant’.53 On the
other hand, China still adheres to the doctrine of absolute immunity,
as was demonstrated in a recent litigation.54 There is room for view-
ing the Chinese position as that of persistent objection. If so, then in
any case dealing with China national courts would first have to query
whether there is a well-established customary rule on immunities in the
first place (which, as we already saw, would be a difficult task); and then
accord immunity to China on the basis of its persistent objection to such
rule if the latter could be identified. If China is a persistent objector, it
can obtain immunity for all its acts, including commercial ones; if not,
then its every pertinent act must be looked at through the prism of the
restrictive doctrine Congreso-style. If either of these two possibilities were
to be displayed within British or American jurisdictions, then in both
cases, the international legal requirement in relation to the UK or the
USA would be to accord or deny immunity to China in disregard of
the ‘general immunity versus specific exceptions’ pattern to which both
the SIA and the FSIA subscribe as sources of domestic law in these two
jurisdictions.
51 See, for an overview, R. Bettauer, ‘Germany Sues Italy at the International Court of Justice
on Foreign Sovereign Immunity – Legal Underpinnings and Implications for US Law’,
ASIL Insight, 19 November 2009.
52 See the amendments to the Canadian State Immunity Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18), 13March
2012.
53 Lafontant v. Aristide, 103 ILR 586; see also United States v. Noriega, 99 ILR 162–3, to
the effect that the US does not consider itself bound under international law to accord
immunity to foreign States and their agents. See, to the same effect, the Judgment of the
US Supreme Court in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, (2004) 541 US 677.
54 Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates, 8 June 2011, Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal.
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Given the absence of a general agreement as to the acts covered by the
restrictive immunity rule, and the Al-Adsani and Jones pretence to the
contrary effect notwithstanding, Lord Denning’s point that ‘there is no
consensus whatever’ as to the customary law status of immunities still
stands.55 The lack of customary law on immunities compellingly suggests
that the restrictive doctrine is at most an interpretative guide for the pre-
existing jurisdictional entitlements of States and that they do not have to
defer jurisdiction, unless some compelling considerations pointing to the
uniquely sovereign activities requires that. And then, this is only a matter
of comity, not a strict legal requirement.
In such circumstances, the only legally defensible approach, as a mat-
ter of international law, is to grant State immunity for a rather narrow
category of official acts that undoubtedly constitute exercises of govern-
mental authority, as specified in the above-examined jurisprudence on
the restrictive doctrine of immunities that most prominently includes
Congreso, and in the scholarly analysis of this area of law.56 Otherwise, a
valid human rights claim could be deniedwithout the forumState actually
owing the obligation to the relevant foreign State to accord immunity. As
shown above, there is sufficient evidence that this position applies both
to criminal and civil proceedings. It would, moreover, stand to no reason
to classify an act or transaction as a sovereign act in relation to one kind
of proceedings but not in relation to another. The issue of the nature of
relevant acts is essentially a pre-proceeding issue. The nature of the act
depends on its own merit and characteristics. The initiation of the par-
ticular form of proceedings is the victim’s choice. It would be absurd to
suggest that due to the victim’s particular choice as to which proceedings
should be used, the nature of an already perpetrated act should change
from X to Y.
3. The (IR)relevance of treaties on State immunity
It is generally admitted that treaties can either codify the pre-existing
customary law, or embody treaty-specific rules and principles that will
subsequently find broader appeal among States, so that they could be
seen as part of customary law as well. However, the threshold of proof on
55 Trendtex [1977] 1 QB 552–3; Lord Wilberforce in Congreso also disapproved the option
of viewing certain national legislation and international treaties as evidence of general
customary law.
56 D. P. O’Connell, International Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), 846; R. Higgins,
Problems and Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 81, 84.
state practice, treaty practice and state immunity 425
demonstrating this much is quite high, as was the case both in the ICJ’s
North Sea judgment and, with regard to State immunity specifically, in
Congreso. The relevant treaties on State immunity are unlikely to meet
these requirements.
The ECSI is in force as between eight States only and falls short of rep-
resenting any generally accepted legal position. The 2004 UNConvention
could not reflect any pre-existing customary law either, as we already saw
through the above focus on State practice. As for the potential generating
customary rules anew, the Convention’s low ratification status and its pri-
oritisation of the ‘general immunity versus specific exceptions’ approach
makes this highly unlikely.
The judicial treatment of these conventions is not free of problems. In
Al-Adsani v. UK, the Strasbourg Court relied on the ECSI to support the
government’s position,57 even though Kuwait was not only not party to
it, but not even eligible to become such. Similarly, the House of Lords in
Jones placed reliance on the 2004 Convention as the ‘most authoritative’
statement of law in this area,58 to support the government’s position, even
though it was not in force. In none of those cases was any effort made
to compare the terms of these conventions to the actual state of State
practice.
The International Court in Germany v. Italy pronounced that both the
1972 and 2004 conventions were inapplicable to acts of armed forces.
The ECSI includes a saving clause on armed forces, while the 2004 Con-
vention was understood to have been prevailingly interpreted the same
way through State practice. The Court also suggested that Article 12 of
the 2004 Convention, denying immunity for territorial torts, does not
represent customary law.59 The reason why this could be the case is solely
because State practice that matters for identifying any possible customary
law in this area – that is practice relating to immunities specifically and
that performed against the background of international, not national,
law – does not take the locus of the act as the principal point of departure;
it merely refers to a simple and straightforward distinction between acts
that are unique to public authority and those that are not.
Furthermore, even if Article 12 of the 2004 Convention does not
apply to armed forces and acts of the latter are supposedly governed by
customary law, this should revert us to the restrictive doctrine theat
focuses on acts unique to State authority, not on the ‘general immunity
57 Al-Adsani, paras. 22, 57–78.
58 Jones, paras. 26 and47 (Lords Bingham and Hoffmann).
59 As indicated in Germany v. Italy, para. 64.
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versus specific exceptions’ approach. Cases on the immunity of armed
forces clearly articulate such version of the restrictive doctrine, as is clear
from Littrell and Lampen-Wolfe, decided directly on the basis of English
common law that incorporates international law. The International Court
was also aware of Norwegian and Swedish positions regarding the scope
of the 2004 Convention and used this as one of the justifications for
dis-applying the territorial tort principle that Article 12 embodies.60 But
this does not quite represent the overall position of the Nordic States,
which is a more pro-accountability one andmight as well require denying
immunity.61 Nor, in the sameproblematic spirit, did theCourt address the
implications of the Swiss position and that of the ILC’s Working Group
that the 2004 Convention was not meant to apply to serious violations of
human rights and breaches of jus cogens.62
Therefore, the Court’s overall position to the relevant treaties is falsely
premised on there being, somewhere in the background, a fall-back
customary rule that obliges States to grant immunity pursuant to the
approach that the Court’s judgment has prioritised.
4. Immunities and human rights treaties
A. Immunities and the European Convention on Human Rights
The context in which State immunity has been discussed in the practice
of the European Court of Human Rights relates to the right to access
60 Germany v. Italy, para. 69.
61 In fact, as the Norwegian Government put it to the Sixth Committee in 2011 on behalf of
the Five Nordic Countries, developments including the adoption of the 1946 Nuremberg
Principles have made it clear that ‘no State official could have been in any doubt about his
or her potential personal responsibility if participating in acts regarded by international
law as crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’; and that these ‘devel-
opments relating to international criminal justice as having contributed significantly to
the normative production and clarification of rules pertaining to the scope for invocation
of immunities. Consequentially, international criminal justice has a bearing on the general
state of the law of immunities, which ought to be recognized.’ Nordic Statement Delivered
to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, Ms Margit Tveiten, Deputy Director
General, 11 January 2011.
62 Switzerland ‘considers that article 12 does not govern the question of pecuniary com-
pensation for serious human rights violations which are alleged to be attributable to a
State and are committed outside the State of the forum. Consequently, this Convention
is without prejudice to developments in international law in this regard.’ The position of
the ILC Working Group is that ‘the Convention does not address questions concerning
immunity arising from civil claims in relation to acts of a State in violation of human
rights norms having the character of jus cogens, particularly the prohibition of torture’.
Immunity of State Officials, Memorandum by the Secretariat, A/CN/4/596, 31 March
2008, 31–2 (para. 46); for the position of Swiss courts see note 98 below.
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to a court under Article 6 ECHR, and whether the grant of immunity
to the State impleaded in domestic proceedings will prejudice this right.
The three initial immunity cases decided by the Strasbourg Court in 2002
did not offer any uniform approach on this matter. In Al-Adsani v. UK,
the Court justified granting immunity for torture to Kuwait without any
proper enquiry into the nature of relevant acts. Two other decisions –
Fogarty v.UK 63 andMcElhinney v. Ireland 64 – adopted a more functional
and less blanket approach, offering a more nuanced application of the
restrictive doctrine of immunity, to evaluate whether the relevant conduct
of the State amounted to acts jure imperii.
Later on, the Strasbourg Court has delivered four other decisions on
State immunity,65 in which some questions are posed in a way that was
not the case in Al-Adsani. In Sabeh El Leil v. France, the Strasbourg Court
explained that:
It would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or
with the basic principle underlying Article 6§1 – namely that civil claims
must be capable of being submitted to a judge for adjudication – if a State
could, without restraint or control by the Convention enforcement bodies,
remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or
confer immunities from civil liability on categories of persons.66
Such statement did not appear in Al-Adsani. The Sabeh El Leil approach
is further in accordance with the European Court’s general priority that
ECHR rights must be secured to individuals in a way that is effective, not
illusory.67
From here, the text step is to identify whether the grant of immunity
would be a proportionate restriction on Article 6 rights. The justifica-
tion in Al-Adsani was that ‘measures taken by a High Contracting Party
which reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on
State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a dispro-
portionate restriction on the right of access to a court as embodied in
Article 6§1’. This was because the ECHR had to be interpreted in line
with other principles of international law pursuant to Article 31(3)(c)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT).68 This
approach to restrict the application of Article 6 in order to comply with
63 Fogarty v. UK, 34 EHRR 12 (2002). 64 McElhinney v. Ireland, 34 EHRR 13 (2002).
65 Cudak v. Lithuania, 15869/02, 23 March 2010; Sabeh El Leil v. France, 34869/05, 29 June
2011; Wallishauser v. Austria, 156/04; Oleynikov v. Russia, 36703/04, 14 March 2013.
66 Sabeh El Leil, para. 50.
67 Soering, 14038/88, 7 July 1989, paras. 87–8; Artico, 6694/74, 13 May 1980, para. 33.
68 Al-Adsani, para. 56.
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other international obligations is not what is required under the VCLT,
because the VCLT admits that treaties prevail over custom as lex specialis.
The Court’s approach also conflicts with the priority stated in other cases
of the Strasbourg Court that wherever States-parties undertake other
international obligations, they should still implement those under the
ECHR.69 It seems that in its practice relating to State immunity the Court
adopts the ‘deference to other rules’ approach, while in all other cases it
prioritises the primacy of the ECHR.
Then, under Al-Adsani, once a competing obligation under another
source of international law is identified, it becomes automatically neces-
sary and proportionate under the ECHR to grant immunity. Contrary to
the priorities stated elsewhere in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, no proper
examination was undertaken in Al-Adsani as to the nature of the relevant
measure, available alternatives or the balance of competing interests. In
Jones v.UK in 2014, no further clarification was provided to this issue and
the precise nature of the relevant acts of torture was not enquired into
either.
In the subsequent jurisprudence that includes Cudak v. Lithuania and
Sabeh El Leil v. France, things seem to be somewhat different. As Sabeh El
Leil suggests, ‘the grant of immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues
the legitimate aim of complyingwith international law to promote comity
and good relations between States’. But a further requirement is then
stated that ‘the impugned restriction must also be proportionate to the
aim pursued’, to which end the restrictive immunity doctrine should be
used as a point of reference.70
The unclear point here – compromising the ability of this projected
position to be applicable on a continuous basis – is whether the grant of
immunity is legitimate because this would ordinarily be done on the basis
of the restrictive doctrine; or whether, alternatively, the legitimacy under
the ECHR of the grant of immunity, even if allegedly justified under
general international law, would further depend on the ECHR-specific
requirement that such grant of immunity should be proportionate to
the ‘legitimate aim’ pursued. The question thus is thus one of normative
69 M&Co v.FRG, ApplicationNo. 13258/87, 9 February 1990, 33YBECHR 1990, 51–2;Waite
& Kennedy v. Germany, 18 February 1999, para. 67; Matthews v. UK, ECHR 24833/94, 18
February 1999, paras. 26–35; Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland, 45036/98, paras.
155–6; Soering v. UK, No. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989; Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v.
UK, Judgment (4th Chamber), No. 61498/08, 2 March 2010; Capital Bank v. Bulgaria,
49429/99, 24 November 2005, paras. 38, 43, 110–11.
70 Sabeh El Leil, paras. 52–3.
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hierarchy, namely whether the ECHR-specific requirements should be
applied subject to the (putative) customary lawon immunities; orwhether
theConventionwould apply as lex specialis and accommodate the position
under that customary law only if it were compatible to those ECHR-
specific requirements.
The judgment in Cudak v. Lithuania suggests that ‘in cases where
the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction
restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court [under Article 6], the
Court must ascertain whether the circumstances of the case justify such
restriction’.71
If this approach is pursued, the relevance of general international law
on immunities matters for the Strasbourg Court only for identifying
whether immunities pursue a legitimate aim, but does not pre-determine
the further issue of whether immunities thus become a proportionate
and legitimate restriction on Article 6. This latter issue must be gone
into separately, contrary to the above-described deference approach in
Al-Adsani and Jones v. UK. Article 6 would, then, prevail as lex specialis,
and allow the grant of immunities only when these would be propor-
tionate under the ECHR specifically, no matter whether they are man-
dated or required under general international law. If this is the current
approach then, at the level of applicable principles at least, the Strasbourg
Court’s approach to immunities seems to have shifted towards a more
pro-accountability stance. However, the Jones v. UK Judgment pressingly
prompts the question as to whether, regarding the relationship between
Article 6 and immunities, the European Court has one single approach
or two separate approaches, each of which could be used through the
voluntary selection at the relevant opportunity.
A separate issue, pursued in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, relates to
the use, in a number of cases, of un-ratified treaties and the ones inappli-
cable inter se, to determine whether the respondent State was bound to
grant immunity.72 As we saw above, the 2004 Convention is not applica-
ble law; it is not in force even for States that have ratified it. The reliance
on it in several cases places the European Court on a rather slippery
71 Cudak, para. 59.
72 Cudak, para. 66 (‘As to the 2004 Convention, Lithuania has admittedly not ratified it but
did not vote against its adoption either’); Sabeh El Leil, para. 57; Wallishauser, para. 31;
Oleynikov, para. 66 (‘Russia has not ratified [the 2004 Convention] but has not opposed
it: on the contrary, it signed the convention on 1 December 2006.’) See, in this regard,
Article 14 VCLT 1969.
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slope. In those cases the outcome was withholding immunity and vin-
dicating Convention rights. But would the European Court accept the
relevance of un-ratified treaties if their requirement will be to cut down
the scope of ECHR rights, as opposed to enforcing these rights effectively
not illusorily? How would the European Court face the claim that the
2004 Convention, not ratified by one or both States involved, and not in
force anyway, requires according immunity but the result thus obtained
is not a necessary and proportionate restriction of Article 6 rights? This
would take matters even further than Al-Adsani did under the pretence of
applying Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, for un-ratified treaties could hardly rep-
resent ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties’. On a more general plane, would the Court deem all
2004 Convention provisions to be part of customary law and adopt the
approach of the absolute deference to the 2004 Convention; and if so, how
would it explain it against the background of other cases that the ECHR
prevails over other treaties?
B. Immunities and Article 1 of the 1984 Convention against Torture
Article 1 CAT defines torture, specifically for its own purposes, as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.
The question raised in jurisprudence is whether such definition has any
bearing on whether torture could be a sovereign act protected by immu-
nity. Lord Browne-Wilkinson suggested in Pinochet that CAT applied
Pinochet’s activities precisely because he had acted as a public official,
namely Head of State.73 Lord Millett observed that ‘[t]he official or gov-
ernmental nature of the act, which forms the basis of the immunity, is
an essential ingredient of the offence [under CAT]. No rational system
of criminal justice can allow an immunity which is co-extensive with the
offence.’74
It seems that, under either of these approaches, Article 1 hardly touches
upon the issue of immunities. Article 1 mentions the ‘act’, ‘public official’
and ‘official capacity’ as separate categories. The meaning of one can-
not pre-empt or pre-determine that of another. The fact that Pinochet
73 [2000] 1 AC 200. 74 [2000] 1 AC 277.
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acted as a public official does not answer the question as to the nature
of his acts. Capacity means ‘ability or power to do something’ and ‘a
specified role or position’.75 The adjective ‘official’ means ‘relating to an
authority’ and ‘permitted or done by a person or group in a position of
authority’.76 Therefore, for the purposes of CAT, ‘official capacity’ should
be understood as the use of that potential, resource or facility that the fact
of being public official uniquely enables one to possess or use. ‘Official
capacity’ can at most mean acts committed ‘while in office’ or ‘when
on duty’. The nature of the ‘act’ perpetrated in that ‘capacity’ remains a
separate issue.
Lord Hoffmann suggested in Jones v. Saudi Arabia that if torture was
‘official enough’ to fall within Article 1 CAT, then it was ‘official enough’
to attract immunity.77 But would a breach of contract or another act
relating to commercial relations by the official while in office be also
‘official enough’? How about withholding salary payment to an embassy
employee hired by an employment contract?
Even if a public official acting in official capacity is a requirement for
application of CAT to the particular act of torture, this is immaterial for
State immunity. Immunities focus on the nature of particular acts, not on
what ‘capacity’ has been used to perpetrate them. A breach of contract can
be committed by a person in ‘a specified role or position’, indeed through
the use of ‘position of authority’ that may distinctively enable that person
to commit that breach of contract. That breach will not thereby become
an official act, even if ‘official capacity’ would be used to perpetrate it.
The restrictive doctrine of immunity requires, instead, focusing on the
nature of the specific act, in this case ‘act by which severe pain’ is inflicted
on a person, which can be perpetrated by anyone, whether or not acting
in official capacity. It is merely the case that, for the purposes of CAT
specifically, only ‘acts’ perpetrated by an official or in official capacity will
be covered by other provisions of the Convention, for the purposes of
prosecution and accountability. Article 1 CAT is not about immunity, but
merely about description and determination of the scope of acts to which
the Convention applies, and thus the scope of CAT ratione materiae.
That Article 1 does not envisage that torture attracts immunity as
an exercise of public or official authority, or act jure imperii, is also
confirmed by aspects of the drafting history of CAT which were not
properly addressed in the relevant cases including Jones. The term ‘official
75 Compact Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn., 2005), 139.
76 Compact OED, 703. 77 Jones, para. 83.
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capacity’ was introduced into Article 1 in order to bring non-State actors
into the scope of that provision. As this demonstrates, Article 1 refers to
torture committed by (a) a ‘public official’ and (b) an ‘other person acting
in an official capacity’. The latter was inserted into the Convention’s text
to cover torture by certain non-State actors, such as rebels, guerrillas or
insurgents, rather than limit the State official’s responsibility to whatever
is done in a strictly official capacity.78 If this approach is followed, a public
official would be liable for any act or torturewhile other individuals would
be liable only for torture committed in that peculiar ‘official capacity’. And
there still would be no relation between Article 1 and immunities.
5. Immunities and normative hierarchy
A. Conventional rules on the accountability for, jurisdiction over, and
prosecution of, international crimes
(i) Criminal jurisdiction and duty to prosecute under CAT
Articles 5 and 7 CAT establish a network of jurisdictional obligations to
prosecute acts of torture. Lord Browne-Wilkinson suggested in Pinochet
that, before the adoption of CAT, jus cogens alone was insufficient to
remove immunity of officials engaging in torture, for ‘not until there was
some form of universal jurisdiction for the punishment of the crime of
torture could it really be talked about as a fully constituted international
crime’.79
On the other hand, as LordHope observed, ‘it would bewrong to regard
the Torture Convention as having by necessary implication removed the
immunity ratione materiae from former heads of state in regard to every
act of torture of any kind which might be alleged against him falling
within the scope of Article 1’. Immunity for torture should be denied on
the alternative basis of criminality pursuant to the developments under
customary international law. Contrary to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view,
Lord Hope observed that the denial of immunity was due to the jus cogens
prohibition of torture, which status was already achieved by the time the
Convention became binding in England.80 Under this view, CAT alone
does not make the required difference.
78 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, UNCAT – A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 78–9.
79 [2000] 1 AC 204–5. 80 [2000] 1 AC 246.
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It is indeed doubtful whether the international criminalisation of tor-
ture is due solely and exclusively toCAT,which does notmention theword
‘crime’ and creates obligations that States have to implement within and
through their national legal systems. Obligations are international, while
the area to which they apply is national. That torture is an international
crimemay be due to elements arising under other sources of international
law.
One possible argument is that of the primacy of CAT jurisdictional
requirements over general international law. But the relative flexibil-
ity of CAT prosecution and extradition arrangements and the logical
antecedence of jurisdiction to immunities could still leave room for the
argument that all CAT requires is to find the place where the torturer can
be tried when requirements of its Article 7 are met, not necessarily that
they can be tried anywhere within the Convention’s spatial remit even if
they can invoke immunity in the forum.
Overall, their Lordship’s treatment of CAT leaves plenty to guess on
what basis CAT can override immunities in criminal proceedings: because
it relates to torture committed in ‘official capacity’, because it establishes
extra-territorial jurisdiction over torture, alone or together with custom-
ary law and jus cogens, or because it is complemented by the alternative
basis that international law regards torture as a crime that no longer fits
within official authority of the State. Pinochet offers no uniform ratio
decidendi on this point and more Law Lords adopted the view of com-
plementation and convergence as between CAT and jus cogens than those
who saw the effect of CAT alone as crucial. Most of the Law Lords in
favour of the denial of immunity have not subscribed to the exclusively
CAT-centred view.
Moreover, the existence of jurisdiction under CAT does not dispose
of the immunity issue, because jurisdiction is antecedent to, and essen-
tially different from, immunities, the latter to be additionally gone into
once the former is duly established. As the ILC Special Rapporteur sug-
gested in relation to treaties such as CAT: ‘If it is argued that immunity
is not compatible with universal jurisdiction, then it is not fully clear
why this should not relate not only to functional but also to personal
immunity.’81
Thus, the ‘jurisdictional’ line of argument82 effectively puts the cart
before the horse. That there is jurisdiction established speaks merely
of the entitlement of the State to prosecute a crime or adjudicate on a
81 Second Report, paras. 74–7. 82 Sanger, ‘Immunity of State Officials’, 223–4.
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tort; it does not directly relate to the nature of the act which is being
subjected to that State’s jurisdiction, nor to the status of the defendant.
As the International Court has observed in Arrest Warrant, jurisdiction is
essentially antecedent to immunities.83
And the bulk of the opinion – carrying greater weight than academic
writings, even if not any inherently binding force – is still unconvinced
by the argument that CAT qua treaty displaces immunities. Both the
ILC Analytical Group and Special Rapporteur on immunities were quite
sceptical regarding the immunities being displaced by extra-territorial
jurisdiction.84 The 2005 Institut de droit international (IDI) Resolution
did not exclude immunities for crimes falling under universal jurisdiction
either.85 The same approach was adopted by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant
case, where it did not admit that treaties such as CAT displace immunities,
even though the particular focus was on immunities ratione personae.86
But surely, as a matter of treaty interpretation pure and simple, if a
treaty such as CAT impliedly incorporates one immunity exception, or
defers to it hierarchy-wise, there is no reason to assert that it does not
similarly accommodate other kinds of immunities. The argument on
CAT versus immunity is essentially that of normative hierarchy, whether
acknowledged by its proponents or not; its essence is that rules under one
source of international law can and must override those under another.
What matters for normative hierarchy is not the conferral of jurisdiction,
which is anyway permissive. In relation toCAT specifically, the crucial fac-
tor could be the overall framework under Articles 5 and 7 that imposes on
States-parties a duty to prosecute and brings together multiple elements
of State jurisdiction (territorial, nationality and universal).
Unfortunately, the national and international practice is divided on
this aspect of normative hierarchy. In Germany v. Italy, the International
Court attempted to a posteriori recast the reasoning inPinochet (in its turn
divided on its point) as based primarily on CAT.87 This puts Germany v.
Italy in conflict with Arrest Warrant, where such impact of treaties like
CAT was not admitted.
On the one hand, CAT has no immunity reservation in it and cannot
have been intended to defer to it. It could prevail over immunities as lex
83 Arrest Warrant, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 59.
84 Immunity of State Officials, Memorandum by the Secretariat, A/CN/4/596, 31 March
2008, paras. 204–7; Second Report, 50–1.
85 IDI Resolution on Universal Jurisdiction, Krakow Session, 2005.
86 Arrest Warrant, para. 59. 87 Germany v. Italy, para. 87.
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posterior. But then, immunitiesmight be seen as lex specialis, referring to a
particular class of torture suspects that could claim immunities, which not
all torture suspects can. While the International Court’s approach is not
entirely satisfactory, the evidence for viable alternatives is not straightfor-
wardly available either. This may explain why most fora are unconvinced
about extra-territorial jurisdiction displacing immunities, for immunities
ratione personae would also be at risk.
It has to be concluded that the position that CAT (a) classes torture
as an official act whereby it (b) ranks it as an act jure imperii and then
(c) removes immunity for that very same act through establishing extra-
territorial criminal jurisdiction over it is a too nuanced and complex rule,
the straightforward support for which cannot be found in the ratio deci-
dendi of Pinochet. It moreover stands to no reason why the Convention
would pronounce on the issue of the scope of immunity, if it does not
on its face, and was never intended to, deal with the subject-matter of
immunities. Or alternatively, if jurisdiction established under CAT dis-
places applicable immunities, why could it not displace ratione personae
immunities of acting heads of State and government?
The proper approach for the rationemateriae immunities would, there-
fore, be to revert, after establishing that jurisdiction over the person under
CAT exists, to the above-examined restrictive doctrine of immunity under
international law to seewhether the act of torture involved couldbe classed
as a sovereign act. CAT does not address, let alone provide the answer to,
this latter question.
(ii) Universal civil jurisdiction under Article 14 CAT
According to Article 14(1) CAT: ‘Each State Party shall ensure in its
legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.’ This clause includes
no restriction ratione loci. Redress should be made available to any victim
of torture, regardless of the locus of the act.
In Bouzari and Jones this extra-territorial effect was not accepted, not
because the relevant national courts denied the inherent potential of
Article 14 to displace immunities, but because Article 14 was seen to
relate only to torture committed within the forum State’s territory.88 But
the UN Committee against Torture has confirmed, in the aftermath of
88 Bouzari v. Islamic Republic or Iran (Court of Appeal for Ontario), 30 June 2004, Docket:
C38295, paras. 72–82, (per Goudge JA); Jones (HL), paras. 20 (per Lord Bingham), 46 (per
Lord Hoffmann).
436 alexander orakhelashvili
Bouzari, that the scope of Article 14 is not limited to torture committed
within the forum’s territory.89
More recently, the Committee’s General Comment No. 3 specified that
‘the application of Article 14 is not limited to victims who were harmed
in the territory of the State party or by or against nationals of the State
party’.90 The duty to implement Article 14 in line with General Comment
No. 3 has then been reiterated in relation to the UK specifically.91
National courts inBouzari and Joneshave, therefore, effectively engaged
in a unilateral interpretation of Article 14, reading in the limitation that
is not there. That the Committee’s views are not inherently binding is,
quite simply, immaterial. The Committee has been set up through the
agreement of all States-parties to CAT and is, on that basis, in charge of
implementing the Convention. Its views as to its content are supposed
to be better than those of States-parties put forward unilaterally. This
is all the more obvious if all the Committee has done, both in relation
to Canada and the UK, is to reaffirm the duty of both States to act in
line with the plain and ordinary meaning of the obligation contained in
Article 14.
B. State immunity and jus cogens
The essence of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) is
their hierarchical superiority over conflicting rules of international law.
Consequently, if and to the extent international law includes a rule on
State immunity, it should be disapplied whenever the enforcement of
a peremptory norm is at stake. A general statement of incompatibility
between jus cogens and immunities has been given by Lord Millett in
Pinochet to the effect that:
The international community had created an offence for which immunity
ratione materiae could not possibly be available. International law cannot
be supposed to have established a crime having the character of a jus cogens
and at the same time to have provided an immunity which is co-extensive
with the obligation it seeks to impose.92
89 UN Committee against Torture, Observations of the Report of Canada, CAT/C/
CO/34/CAN, paras. 4(g) and 5(f).
90 General Comment No. 3 (2012), para. 22.
91 Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom, adopted by
the Committee at its fiftieth session (6–31 May 2013), para. 17.
92 [2000] 1 AC 278.
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One way in which immunities are impacted upon by jus cogens is that the
acts prohibited by jus cogens offend against the public policy of the inter-
national legal system and therefore cannot count as sovereign acts that
attract immunity. This reasoning fits perfectly with the overall rationale
of the restrictive doctrine of immunity, as discussed above, as relating to
acts not unique to State authority. Instead, these acts can be committed
by anyone, whether or not in a position of authority, for which reason
they should not attract immunity.
Another way jus cogens impacts immunities is the direct hierarchical
primacy. This line of reasoning was put forward by the minority in Al-
Adsani, to the effect that the rules of jus cogens prevail over all conflicting
rules. Therefore:
The prohibition of torture, being a rule of jus cogens, acts in the interna-
tional sphere and deprives the rule of sovereign immunity of all its legal
effects in that sphere. The criminal or civil nature of the domestic pro-
ceedings is immaterial. The jurisdictional [and procedural] bar is lifted by
the very interaction of the international rules involved, and the national
judge cannot admit a plea of immunity.93
Courts that have denied the primacy of jus cogens over immunities have
not advocated any coherent basis for such approach. The European Court
inAl-Adsani has adopted an evidentiary approach that while in relation to
criminal proceedings the impact of jus cogens on immunities was recog-
nised in international practice, the same was not the case in relation to
civil proceedings. The House of Lords in Jones, and the ICJ in Germany v.
Italy, have considered that immunities are of procedural character and
not affected by substantive rules of jus cogens. All three courts have, how-
ever, distinguished the criminal proceedings aspect as per Pinochet rather
than contradicting it. But their reasoning rang hollow, given that criminal
immunities are just as ‘procedural’ as civil immunities, and if jus cogens
can bite on the former, there is no reason why it cannot bite on the lat-
ter. This runs, then, into the issue that the (non)sovereign nature of acts
for the purposes of the restrictive doctrine is a pre-proceeding issue and
that if an act contradicting jus cogens is not jure imperii in one type of
proceedings, it cannot be so in other kind of proceedings either.
The approach in Arrest Warrant that immunities are of a procedural
nature was premised on the availability of alternative remedies to which
condition the subsequent pro-immunity judicial practice did not adhere.
93 Joint Dissenting Opinion, Al-Adsani, paras. 1, 3–4.
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Lords Bingham and Hoffmann suggested in Jones that State immunity
does not really contradict the jus cogens prohibition of torture but merely
diverts its enforcement to other fora.94 In the same spirit, criminal immu-
nities would be no less procedural and jurisdictional so as tomerely divert,
in the language of pro-immunity proponents, the issue to another forum.
That is pretty much the Special Rapporteur’s position.95 This is one more
instance evidencing that the frequently repeated civil/criminal distinction
does not work.
The reality is, moreover, that no diversion of the issue to another
mode of settlement ever takes place in practice in cases where immunity
is upheld. The outcome of the upholding of immunity in the cases of
Al-Adsani v UK, Bouzari, Jones and Germany v. Italy is that the victims
were left without any available remedy. This position leads precisely to
the condonation and encouragement of the initial act of torture and
total legal security for future acts of torture. If the grant of immunity
to the State establishes the legal position that – as between the forum
State and the perpetrating State – there are no legal consequences for
the relevant act of torture, then this position automatically entails the
position that in the mutual relations of those two States the prohibition
of torture does not operate as a legal prohibition and takes no effect as
a legal rule. The overall essence of the substance-jurisdiction divide is,
therefore, conceptually incoherent, ethically controversial and practically
unsound.96
The principal and mainline effect of jus cogens norms is always conse-
quential, that is relates to facts, situations, rights and entitlements estab-
lished, or purported to be established, after a substantive peremptory rule
has been breached. In all areas where jus cogens applies, it deals with sit-
uations arising after the wrongful act. In addition to the VCLT, the areas
of State responsibility, statehood and recognition, unilateral acts, waiver
and acquiescence, or acts of international organisations, are virtually
94 Jones (HL), paras. 24 and 44 (both referring to H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (1st
edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)).
95 The Special Rapporteur suggests that ‘Peremptory norms criminalizing international
crimes lie within the sphere of substantive law. The norm concerning immunity is, as
noted above, procedural in character, does not affect criminalization of the acts under
discussion, does not abrogate liability for them and does not even fully exclude criminal
jurisdiction in respect of these acts’, at 39, para. 64 (emphasis original).
96 This view is also developed in cases and in writings without properly addressing the
underlying issues of normativity, normative hierarchy and normative conflict. On which
see A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Classification of International Legal Rules: A Reply to Stefan
Talmon’, (2013) 26 LJIL, 89.
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unanimous in recognising the effect of jus cogens in relation to situa-
tions produced after the violation of the relevant peremptory norm.97
The principal effect of jus cogens is to consequentially deny the rights,
privileges and qualifications the relevant State action would command
but for the peremptory status of the rule that the conduct in question
violates. Indeed, Article 41 of the Articles on State Responsibility refers to
a ‘situation created by the breach’ of jus cogens,which is impunity and lack
of remedies as an immediate consequence of the denial of immunities in
comparable situations. The whole approach in Jones, as well as Germany
v. Italy, recognises precisely that situation as lawful, and is essentially
aimed at perpetuating that situation.
This runs precisely into the issue of derogation from jus cogens through
the grant of immunities. Thenon-derogability of peremptorynorms is not
limited to the ambit of Article 53 VCLT. Instead, Article 53 is one specific
expression of non-derogability that operates throughout the international
legal system covering the areas highlighted above. Derogation can be
initiated through unilateral acts or practice, formally or informally.
Derogation is inherently a phenomenon that intends to preserve, on
a general plane, the validity of the rule derogated from, yet prevent its
applicability to a case, or class of cases, towhich the derogation in question
relates. Immunities attempt doing to relevant peremptory norms just that.
For our purposes, derogation from jus cogens norms through the grant of
immunity to the defendant projects – inter se and in casu – the putative
legal position that the prohibition under the relevant jus cogens norm
shall take no legal effect and an act committed in contravention with
that norm shall operate as a lawful act attracting privileges and rights
that lawful acts could ordinarily attract. If jus cogens norms were merely
substantive prohibitions, it could be argued with the same effect that a
treaty contrary to jus cogens could be upheld as valid because it does not
go to the primary norm containing prohibition of the relevant act but
merely prevents the rule that outlaws that act from being invocable and
enforceable in mutual relations between States-parties to that treaty. Or
that an entity established through the aggressive war could be recognised
as a State, much as the prohibition of the use of force remains intact on a
general plane.
97 ILC’s Articles 40–1 on State Responsibility, ILC Report (2001), GAOR, Fifty-sixth session,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). States shall not ‘recognise as lawful a situation created by
a serious breach’ of jus cogens (Article 41). ILC Guide on Unilateral Acts, A/61/10, Article
8; Articles 41–2, ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, 2nd
reading, 2011, A/66/10.
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If, as was the case with Al-Adsani and Jones, the UK gives Kuwait or
Saudi Arabia total legal security for their acts of torture as far as UK–Saudi
and UK–Kuwaiti bilateral relations are concerned, the effect is the same
as would be if a treaty with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were to be con-
cluded to the effect that the international prohibition of torture has no
effect in UK–Saudi and UK–Kuwaiti relations. The only difference would
be one of form, consisting in a written agreement as opposed to the agree-
ment through State practice. If the outcome in question could be lawfully
secured through informal practice, it could also be secured through a
written agreement. In either case, and in both criminal and civil proceed-
ings, liability for the breach of a jus cogens rule would be abrogated, in a
way opposite to the ILC Special Rapporteur’s above thesis.
Furthermore, if it were correct that peremptory norms are merely sub-
stantive rules incapable of affecting the immunity, it has to invariably
apply to civil and criminal proceedings, and State and official immunity
alike. Yet, the position of several courts as well as the Institute of Interna-
tional Law demonstrates that such generalised assumption is unsustain-
able.
Apart from misreading the impact of jus cogens in Pinochet, the ICJ in
Germany v. Italy did not address the 2009 Naples IDI Resolution, which
upholds the lifting of immunity in civil proceedings for conduct that
constitutes international crime (Article III). It relies on ‘the underlying
conflict between immunity from jurisdiction of States and their agents
and claims arising from international crimes’, and intends to contribute to
‘a resolution of that conflict’ (preamble). The Resolution thus refers to the
existence of normative conflict between the two sets of rules.Onwhat basis
other than jus cogenswould, one wonders, the criminality of a relevant act
prevail in this normative conflict? And the Resolution specifies no such
alternative basis, speaking instead of the normative hierarchy pure and
simple.
After Germany v. Italy judicial practice has continued confirming the
incompatibility between immunities and jus cogens, and the latter’s pri-
macy over the former. The Swiss Federal Tribunal reiterated the same
view.98 The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit likewise con-
firmed in Samantar that: ‘Because this case involves acts that violated
jus cogens norms, including torture, extrajudicial killings and prolonged
arbitrary imprisonment of politically and ethnically disfavored groups,
98 Judgment of 25 July 2012 (case no. BB.2011.140), paras. 5.3.5 and 5.4.3.
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we conclude that Samantar is not entitled to conduct based official immu-
nity under the common law, which in this area incorporates international
law.’99
The assertion of substance versus jurisdiction dichotomy is, therefore,
premised on a political choice made by a court or by a writer to support
the grant of immunity that is politically desirable under the circumstances.
The view that requires denying immunity on the basis of jus cogens is,
on the other hand, premised solely on the continuation of the normative
effect that jus cogens already has in other areas of international law.
There are further advantages of the jus cogens approach over the above-
examined ‘jurisdictional’ approach, in that the latter focuses on exercising
jurisdiction then and there, while the former focuses on the norma-
tive integrity of the relevant peremptory norm. As we saw above, the
jurisdiction-based treaty primacy over immunities could be too blanket,
and set at risk the ratione personae immunities of an acting Head of State.
On the other hand, the impact of jus cogens is not that blanket, for it only
requires preventing immunity rules fromderogating from jus cogens rules,
and thus fits comfortably with the approach developed in paragraph 61 of
the Arrest Warrant case, preserving ratione personae immunities of acting
high-level officials intact, not as a permanent state of affairs perpetuat-
ing impunity, but only preventing prosecution in particular jurisdictions,
and then only while the official’s term of office lasts. The whole question
is not about whether the State in question should exercise jurisdiction
over the relevant person in the particular place and time, but whether
the exercise or decline of that jurisdiction will prevent the operation of
the relevant jus cogens rules as legal rules, undermine their normative
content and effect, and make them inoperable in relation to the relevant
internationally wrongful act. Immunities ratione personae could thus be
preserved without causing a derogation from jus cogens.
Overall, whether immunities are admitted for a violation of jus cogens
on a permanent and general, or temporary and special, basis cannot
be without importance to the question whether a derogation from the
relevant jus cogens rule takes place. Immunities ratione personae do not
inevitably derogate from jus cogens because they: (a) do not require that
the relevant acts are official functions, as they are not premised on that
basis at all; (b) they inherently admit the possibility of prosecution in
other jurisdictions or in the same jurisdiction after the official ceases to
be in office; and (c) they do not entail impunity. On the other hand,
99 Bashe Abdi Yousuf v. Mohamed Ali Samantar, No. 11-1479, 2 November 2012, at 23.
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immunities ratione personae do derogate from jus cogens because they: (a)
project the relevant crimes and violations as official and sovereign acts;
(b) project a permanently opposable legal position that the act of the State
in question could never be adjudicated upon abroad; and (c) invariably
entail impunity and the lack of remedies.
This way jus cogens offers a compromised view further compatible
with developments in judicial practice, because both Pinochet and Arrest
Warrant did single out ratione personae immunities as a special category.
Jus cogens can accommodate and preserve ratione personae immunities of
a limited number of high-level officials, while displacing ratione materiae
immunities of both States and their officials.
C. Convergence between CAT and jus cogens
The above analysis still leaves one aspect of CAT to be gone into because,
as we saw above, the ordinary meaning of Articles 5 and 7 CAT establish
the duty to prosecute torturers and should, in principle, require displacing
any applicable immunity,much as this was not straightforwardly accepted
in judicial practice. The principal dilemma produced by the divergent
practice is that while CAT as a treaty should prevail over immunities, the
latter could in principle be seen as lex specialis, in relation to which the
primacy of treaties over other rules may not necessarily help.
On the other hand, if we view Articles 5 and 7 CAT as expressive
of the general doctrine of jus cogens in relation to prosecution of core
international crimes, they could, then, secure the outcome that a treaty
qua treaty is unlikely to achieve. This general doctrine was mirrored in
Lord Hope’s observation in Pinochet that:
the prohibition of [torture] which has acquired the status under interna-
tional law of jus cogens . . . compels all states to refrain from such conduct
under any circumstances and imposes an obligation erga omnes to punish
such conduct.100
And as it happens, Articles 5 and 7 CAT do very much the same thing.
There is increasing recognition in practice of the growing and sus-
tained convergence as between normative regimes under CAT and under
jus cogens, and their interchangeable use. The European Court in Oth-
man specified that ‘UNCAT reflects the clear will of the international
community to further entrench the ius cogens prohibition on torture by
100 [2000] 1 AC 242.
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taking a series of measures to eradicate torture and remove all incentive
for its practice’.101 This point further undermines the argument that the
denial of the immunity of a former head of State by the House of Lords
in Pinochet was undertaken on the basis of CAT as completely separate
from jus cogens. CAT and jus cogens were also interchangeably used by the
House of Lords in A v. Secretary of State.102
Under this approach, the effect on immunities under Articles 5 and
7 CAT is merely to reflect and reinforce whatever consequences obtain
from the fact that torture is a wrongful act and crime outlawed under a
rule of jus cogens. Once jurisdiction under CAT would be established over
the case, the denial of immunity would be justified only if doing other-
wise would entail impunity for the underlying crime or atrocity, which
in terms of normative hierarchy would amount to a derogation from the
underlying rule of jus cogens the way that makes that rule unenforceable
and imapplicable in relation to that relevant case.Ratione personae immu-
nities would be preserved as per Arrest Warrant, unlike ratione materiae
immunities.
6. The position at English law
The outcome obtained through the above analysis of international law
applicable to immunities needs now to be applied to the position under
the ordinary sources of English law. In relation to common law, we need
to see how far the international legal position is incorporated into the
English common law. In relation to statutory law, we need to ascertain
the impact of the SIA. As we are also addressing the continuing effect of
previous court decisions, we need to examine the doctrine of precedent
for that purpose.
A. State immunity and policy considerations before English courts
When focusing on the decisions of English courts regarding State immu-
nity, it is not easy to ascertain to what extent the political risks thought
to be involved in the relevant case are among those that enter the minds
of those who adjudicate. Yet it is undeniable that transnational human
rights claims inevitably look different from ordinary torts, in terms of the
remoteness from the forum, identity of perpetrators and applicable law.
101 Othman v. UK, 8139/09, 17 January 2012, para. 266.
102 A v. Secretary of State [2005] UKHL 71, 8 December 2005.
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All this cannot fail to generate fears as to possible adverse consequences
of the relevant litigation that both decision-makers and commentators
would, subconsciously at least, be concerned with. The treatment on
these issues would therefore be incomplete without addressing these pol-
icy considerations.
This process could also involve a complex balance of interests entail-
ing morally controversial outcomes, for instance by prioritising political
factors over humanitarian considerations. It is, among others, for this
reason, that the express articulation of policy argument in judicial rea-
soning is considerably rare; where it appears it is mostly used as part of
applying already established legal principles103 and in relation to the for-
eign State immunities it is practically absent. Ordinarily, English courts
are expected to separate law from politics and not to enter into assess-
ing the political merits of the issues underlying the relevant litigation.
They are expected to leave political considerations to other branches of
the government, and only apply the existing law to underlying facts.104
In relation to international law specifically, the use of policy arguments
could not suitably happen in English courts. Unlike areas of English law
such as tort law, English courts do not create and develop public interna-
tional law the way they do with common law. They merely reflect the law
consensually adopted at the inter-State level, which the national authority
cannot unilaterally curtail or modify.105
As for the specific risks, it may be suggested that allowing civil claims
against foreign sovereigns could lead to the deterioration of inter-State
relations. But it is far from obvious how far it could be a judicial task
to draw the balance on complex issues of the dynamics of international
relations on which the Judiciary possesses no obvious expertise. More
generally, there is no clear evidence to suggest that any serious deteriora-
tion of inter-State relations is likely if immunity is denied. In some other
contexts, the possibility of the deterioration of UK-Saudi relations might
have motivated the outcome in the BAE case before the House of Lords,
but the outcome of the House of Lords decision was framed, however
unsustainably, in legal terms, namely through reading the national secu-
rity exception in the relevant international agreement that, quite simply,
103 SeeMcLoughlin v.O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 at 430 (per Lord Scarman); seemore generally
John Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
104 See Lord Templemann in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary State for the Envi-
ronment [1986] AC 240 at 265–6.
105 See more specifically subsection B below.
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was not there.106 If policy considerations were used here as premise, then
the outcome of the case was based not just on the use of those policy
considerations but on letting them bend the applicable law.
On a broader plane, not every irritant could inevitably entail a dete-
rioration of inter-State relations. As deterioration is a bilateral matter, it
must also be queried whether the outcome of cases like Al-Adsani and
Jones and the payment of the – rather modest if the income and revenues
of the relevant States are considered – compensation to victims would
amount to grounds sufficient for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to revise their
traditionally good relations with the UK. Fears like these are based on no
more than speculation. The deterioration of bilateral relations, or inter-
ference with the defendant State’s sovereignty in relation to its resources,
is not more likely than in the case of litigation drawing on the relevant
State’s commercial interests and resulting in much higher expense and
damages, yet falling within the letter of the SIA, such as commercial, ter-
ritorial tort or employment-related exceptions. A more recent instance of
Gary McKinnon not being extradited to the United States, having been
wanted there for the allegations of the unlawful access to sensitivemilitary
computers of the US government, could be just as irritating at the inter-
State level as would be the transnational human rights litigation involving
the United States as defendant. For, McKinnon was wanted in the United
States in the public interest, while granting compensation to Al-Adsani
and Jones would never have gone as far as impeding Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia in pursuing the line of their foreign and domestic policies that
they determine in the exercise of their sovereignty.107
The projected risk of the multiplication of claims known as litigation
flood is, too,merely theoretical. The denial of immunity would in practice
have the preventive impact on the governments engaging in torture whose
assets abroad would be exposed, and could lead to reforms in the relevant
State’s domestic law and practice that will reduce the occurrence of torture
by the same State in the future.108 Less torturemeans less litigation abroad.
Moreover, English courts have been generally sceptical about such fears as
106 BAE (HL), [2008] UKHL 60, 30 July 2008, para. 46 (per Lord Bingham).
107 More recently, the UK seems to have accepted the risk of irritation in bilateral relations
as a consequence of domestic judicial proceedings in the UK, in relation toMongolia and
Nepal, as in Khurts Bat. See also the report regarding the prosecution of a Nepalese offi-
cial for torture: www.guardian.co.uk/law/2013/jan/06/uk-defends-prosecute-nepalese-
colonel?INTCMP=SRCH.
108 To illustrate other related contexts, proceedings in the Pinochet case before English courts
played the role of the catalyst towards altering the domestic perception to accountability
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to floods of litigation. As Lord Edmund-Davies observed inMcLoughlin v.
O’Brian, concernedwith the extensionof tortuous liability, hewas ‘uncon-
vinced that the number and area of claims in “shock” cases would be
substantially increased or enlarged were the respondents here held liable’.
He had ‘often seen [the floodgates argument] disproved by later events’.
Lord Scarman seconded that ‘[t]he “floodgates” argument may be exag-
gerated’.109
Ordinarily, thus, English courts refuse letting policy reasons affect the
outcome of the case so as to modify the applicability of the established
sources of law. In Dorset Yacht, Lord Reid referred to the American case-
law that exempted prison officials from civil liability because of the heavy
risky nature of their jobs, but observed that ‘Her Majesty’s servants are
made of sterner stuff’, and had ‘no hesitation in rejecting this argument’
seeing ‘no good ground in public policy for giving this immunity to a
government department’.110
B. Common law and the doctrine of incorporation
From the eighteenth century onwards, the view championed by Sir
William Blackstone and accepted in the English legal system has been
that international law as such and as a whole forms part of English law.
The doctrine of incorporation served as the basis on which English courts
initially applied the absolute doctrine of State immunity.111 Subsequently,
in the Trendtex and Congreso litigation, the incorporation approach has
been applied to the newer restrictive doctrine as part of international, and
now of English, law.
Dealing with the older rule of absolute immunity in Cristina, Lord
Atkin referred to the ‘propositions of international law engrafted into our
domestic law which seem to me to be well established and to be beyond
dispute’. That position applied both to the sovereign’s person and to their
property, both to in rem and in personam claims.112 Lord Macmillan
similarly entertained no doubt as to the direct effect of international
in Latin American countries, see generally N. Roht-Ariazza, The Pinochet Effect: Transna-
tional Justice in the Age of Human Rights (Philidelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2005). More recently, the litigation saga concerning Abu-Qatada caused the Jorda-
nian Government to amend the Constitution and ban the use in courts of the evidence
obtained through torture: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20295754.
109 McLoughlin, 425 (per Lord Edmund-Davies), 431 (per Lord Scarman).
110 Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, 1032–3.
111 See, e.g.,Gagara [1919] P 95; Porto Alexandre [1920] P 30.
112 Cristina [1938] AC 485, 490–1.
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law in the English legal system, with the implication that the domestic
effect should be given to international legal rules to the extent that they
have been agreed upon as between sovereign States. For, ‘such a principle
must be an importation from international law’. The position was more
complicated when ‘there is no proved consensus of international opinion
or practice to this effect’ and when ‘the subject is one on which divergent
views exist and have been expressed among the nations’.113
InCristina, their Lordships havemanaged to avoid resolving the conflict
as between the earlier cases of Parlement Belge, where the outcome as to
immunities had been differentiated in terms of the function of a ship
involved in the relevant proceedings,114 and Porto Alexandre, where a
more absolute approach was adopted; for the ship involved in Cristina
had been requisitioned by the Spanish government for public purposes.115
The signs of the acceptance of the restrictive doctrine were already
shown by English courts in the nineteenth century, considerably ear-
lier than the absolute immunity rule was definitely abandoned. In the
Charkieh case, Sir Robert Phillimore – adjudicating, again, from the per-
spective of the incorporation doctrine – considered that:
I am not prevented from holding, what it appears to me the justice of the
case, would otherwise require, that proceedings of this kind, in rem, may
in some cases at least be instituted without any violation of international
law, though the owner of the res be in the category of persons privileged
from personal suit . . . [however] a proceeding in rem cannot be instituted
against the property of a sovereign or ambassador if the res can in any fair
sense be said to be connected with the jus coronae of the sovereign.116
This provided at least an initial inference that sovereign activity is what
the sovereign is ordinarily meant to be doing, not what he in fact does.
Most importantly, Sir Robert Phillimore specified that:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no dictum of
jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize a sovereign to
113 Ibid., 497–8; the incorporation approach was also upheld by Lord Wright, ibid., 502.
114 On which the House of Lords has subsequently observed in Philippine Admiral that
‘the judgment of the Court of Appeal [in Parlement Belge] – delivered by Brett LJ. – has
sometimes been taken as saying that a sovereign can claim immunity for vessels owned by
him even if they are admittedly being used wholly or substantially for trading purposes.
In their Lordships’ view the judgment does not lay down that wide proposition at all’,
Philippine Admiral [1977] AC 373, 392 (per Lord Cross).
115 Cristina, 496, 498 (per Lords Thankerton and Macmillan); but see Philippine Admiral,
394, for drawing the contrast between those two earlier cases. Therefore, Porto Alexandre
was not followed.
116 Charkieh [1872–75] 4 LR 59, 93.
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assume the character of a trader, when it is for his benefit; and when he
incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw off, if I may so speak,
his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming for his own benefit, and
to the injury of a private person, for the first time, all the attributes of his
character; while it would be easy to accumulate authorities for the contrary
position.117
This reasoning leads to the consideration of the issue of how, in the first
place, the sovereign enters the marketplace, or more generally private
relations. In whichever way you enter it, so you carry on. This approach
got further developed in Congreso where Lord Wilberforce emphasised
that if an act can be performed by private persons it is no longer a
sovereign act. Applying this test to serious human rights violations would
also exclude them from the scope of jure imperii acts.
The 2006House of Lords decision in Jones, Milling & Pritchard has sug-
gested some qualifications to the doctrine of incorporation. The principal
findings were that the international crime of aggression was not automat-
ically criminalised under English law to enable domestic prosecutions to
take place; and, more generally, international law was not part of English
law, but one of its sources.118 However, the judgment has not explained
the difference between the two options. It is indeed difficult to see how
international law could be a source of English law without being its part,
and vice versa. This obscurity in reasoning compromises the potential of
Jones, Milling & Pritchard to impact our continuous understanding of the
doctrine of incorporation. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the approach in this case was correct, it is only about the specific issue
of criminalisation. Therefore Jones must be seen as being constrained to
its context and as having little legal relevance for other areas of public
international law including the law of immunities.
On a broader plane, English courts are unlikely to abandon the incor-
poration doctrine, even in the face of some of the current thinking that
the ‘dualistic’ approach should be used to separate the domestic applica-
tion of international law from the accountability of the United Kingdom
for the breaches of international law on the inter-State plane and before
international courts and tribunals.119 The abandonment of the fuller
version of the doctrine of incorporation would entail two negative impli-
cations. In the first place, declining to apply the relevant international law
117 Ibid., 99–100.
118 R v. Jones, Milling et al., House of Lords [2006] UKHL 16, 29 March 2006.
119 See, for instance, P. Sales and J. Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: A
Developing Framework’, (2008) 124 LQR, 388.
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domestically could, under circumstances, constitute the evidence that
a breach of international law has been committed and that domestic
courts have essentially ratified it.120 In the second place, such ‘dualism’
couldpotentially lead to isolationism, diminishing thepotential of English
courts to contribute to the development of State practice internationally.
For, as Brierly has wisely reminded us, ‘international law is a customary
law and it is developed by agencies which include, but are not limited to,
the English Courts’.121 Evading the domestic effect of customary inter-
national law, whether through the Jones, Pritchard & Milling route, or
through the application of the SIA,122 essentially evidences the unwilling-
ness of domestic courts to apply international law to underlying facts. It is
highly presumptive, to say the least, that the cases decided on the basis of
that which excludes international law from the judicial focus could validly
amount to State practice as part of custom-generation internationally.
Dualism, on its valid version, relates to the origin and sources of rel-
evant rules. For the purposes of English law dualism only means that
international law is not produced by the same sources of English law
as are domestic legislation and common law. It is produced elsewhere,
internationally, and then incorporated into English law. The traditional
version of the incorporation doctrine is essentially premised on the dualist
tradition, which means that English courts give domestic effect to the set
of rules that has not been produced by the domestic law-giver, andmake it
part of English law.123 This is different from the domestic transformation
of international treaties where, unlike the common law incorporation of
customary international law, the domestic legislator creates a new domes-
tic legislative rule to reflect that which has been internationally enacted
on a separate basis.
C. The impact of the 1978 State Immunity Act
When the selection as between common and statutory law is conducted
in terms of which of them should be applied to the underlying claims
120 According to Article 4 of the ILC’s Draft on State responsibility, a breach of international
law can be committed by any State organ, including judicial organs. See 2 ILC Yearbook
(2001), 40 (Article 4 and its commentary).
121 J. L. Brierly, ‘International Law in England’, (1935) 51 LQR, 24 at 34’.
122 See the next sub-section for the SIA more generally.
123 This is further reflected in the principle, expounded by Dicey, that English law is not
necessarily limited to rules produced exclusively by domestic authorities but includes all
rules that English courts apply, regardless of their origin. A. V. Dicey, A Digest of the Law
of England with the Reference to the Conflict of Laws (London: Steven & Sons, 1896), 6ff.
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relating to sovereign immunity, two important issues are at stake. In the
first place, as we already saw, the common law standard that incorpo-
rates general international law requires the application of the functional
approach to immunities under which the acts that constitute the proper
exercises of governmental authority do attract immunity and the ones
that do not fall within such category do not. The SIA eschews such clas-
sification and instead turns to the ‘general rule versus specific exceptions’
approach, under which all that does not fall within the specified statu-
tory exceptions, and whatever the underlying nature of the relevant act
or transaction, will attract immunity under the general statutory rule
of immunity. Results could then be substantially different depending on
which of these approaches is taken.
In the second place, the adherence to the SIA could entail the legitima-
tion, through the backdoor, of the domestic standing and applicability of
some international conventions that may not be apt for the use in domes-
tic courts, given that internationally they do not constitute the applicable
law as between the UK and the relevant foreign States. This concerns,
in the first place, the ECSI. This also applies to the 2004 Convention,
which, despite some enthusiastic references in judicial practice,124 is nei-
ther signed nor ratified by the substantial number of States to turn it into
the applicable law. Even if it were to gather the required thirty ratifications,
it would only be applicable law inter se.
Apart from these treaties that are either not in force or have a rather
limited scope of application ratione personae, there is no evidence what-
soever that the general, or customary, international law – which still, and
inevitably, prevails apart from the narrow scope of inter-State relations
where the relevant convention could prevail as lex specialis – subscribes to
any version of that ‘general immunity versus specific exceptions’ approach
that the two conventions uphold. Again, thismay lead foreign States being
accorded immunity where applicable international law does not require
doing so or, alternatively, denying such immunities as may be due to
be accorded. In fact, Article 24 of the ECSI effectively recognises that
the Convention regime is the special one that purports to derogate from
the general international law that applies in relation to non-parties and
would, but for the Convention regime, apply inter se as well. The possibil-
ity is thus provided for to part, for the purposes of the relevant case, with
the ‘general immunity versus specific exceptions’ approach and revert to
the fall-back position under general international law that focuses on the
124 E.g. by Lords Bingham and Hoffmann in Jones (HL), paras. 27 and 46.
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sovereign and non-sovereign acts. As Sir Ian Sinclair has suggested: ‘This
optional regime was included because certain States already applying the
rule of relative immunity were afraid that some acts jure gestionis might
fall outside the catalogue of cases of non-immunity, thereby restricting the
jurisdiction of their courts’,125 and thus manifesting the understanding
that the underlying regimes of immunity are dual.
Ways for resolving the dilemma within the English legal system have
been suggested. As Lord Phillips has pointed out in NML v. Argentina,
the SIA was enacted to give domestic effect to the ECSI. However,
‘[t]he ECSI does not give effect to the restrictive doctrine of sovereign
immunity’.126 As Lord Goff had earlier observed in Kuwait Air Co, the
overall impact of Article 24 ECSI, which enables States-parties to declare
accordingly, entails the ‘inapplicability in English law of the principle of
sovereign immunity in cases in which the sovereign was not acting jure
imperii’.127
The SIA is obviously the outcome of Parliament’s exercise of its legisla-
tive supremacy. However, the ascertainment of the content of legislation,
and the impact thereof on common law, is an entirely judicial task. In
the English legal system, legislative supremacy operates subject to the
requirements of the rule of law,128 and law is what courts say it is.129
In order not to let domestic proceedings distort the outcomes required
under international law, the proper interpretation of the SIA assumes
a major importance. Purely as a matter of statutory construction, the
underlying classical rules – literal, mischief and golden – are not arranged
in a hierarchical manner. The literal approach seems to have prevailed
in some previous cases before English courts, to the effect that the SIA
was deemed to be a ‘comprehensive code’ on State immunity, preclud-
ing domestic courts from addressing the distinction between sovereign
and non-sovereign acts as international law requires to be taken into
account.130 On the other hand, other means of statutory interpretation
125 I. Sinclair, ‘The European Convention on State Immunity’, (1973) 22 ICLQ, 254 at 268.
126 NML v. Argentina [2011] UKSC 31, 6 July 2011, para. 37 (per Lord Phillips).
127 Kuwait Air Co [1995] 1 WLR 1147 at 1158 (per Lord Goff).
128 Jackson v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, para. 107 (per Lord Hope).
129 H. R. W. Wade and C. F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th edn., Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 26.
130 See the following British and American cases: Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 103 ILR
455; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 33 ILM (1994), 1483; Smith et al. v. Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 36 ILM (1997), 100; Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 ILR 536. The point made
here is the same as above in note 118 and the accompanying text.
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could be helpful to understand what options are available to apply or not
to apply the SIA to the relevant immunity claim.
When the SIA was being enacted and deliberated upon in Parliament,
Lord Wilberforce and Lord Denning expressed some misgivings about it.
Both their Lordships spoke against universalising the regional regime of
the ECSI and making it applicable to all States.131 Lord Denning went
further and suggested that the State immunity bill had to be put on hold
because (a) it did not reflect international law as it then stood (along with
the distinction between functional and statutory tests as detailed above);
and (b) it aimed at conserving the legal position which was in a constant
state of development.132
The key question for the constructionof the SIA should thus be to ascer-
tain whether the legislator would have intended to universalise the very
restricted regime of the ECSI, that is make it internationally opposable
to States that neither signed nor ratified it, with the far-reaching implica-
tions contradicting the pacta tertiis principle. What militates against this
assumption is that there is no entitlement to impose, through the sources
of domestic law, on foreign States the law that is not internationally oppos-
able to them. In theWHO-Egypt case, the ICJ applied this approach to the
relationship between the World Health Organization (WHO) and Egypt
in terms of relocating the WHO regional office from Alexandria. Neither
the WHO nor Egypt could externalise their unilaterally produced law on
each other, and the matter of the relocation of theWHO office could only
be governed by international law that bound the two entities together,
not by Egyptian law, nor by the WHO’s internal rules.133 This pattern is
evenmore pressing with inter-State relations. The law applicable between
the UK and foreign States impleaded before English courts is that which
binds the UK and those foreign States together: those rules of public
international law to which both relevant States have given their consent.
The persistence with the application, through the domestic legislation, to
foreign States of the rules to which they may not have consented could
prove counter-productive. Despite the dogma of ‘dualism’, when applying
the SIA, English courts effectively pronounce on international and inter-
State relations, which are governed by public international law in the first
131 It will be noted that the ECSI has only eight States-parties and thus it was not applicable
to the major controversies focused upon in this chapter.
132 See, generally, the Hansard (HL) volume 388 cc51–78, 17 January 1978; and volume 949
cc405–20, 3 May 1978 (interventions by Lords Wilberforce and Denning).
133 Interpretation of theAgreement of 25March 1951 between theWHOandEgypt, Advisory
Opinion of 20 December 1980, ICJ Reports, 1980, 73.
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place, and which may not always overlap with the position that the SIA
purports to establish.
To illustrate, China, which adheres to absolute immunity, would grant
the requisite protection to the United Kingdom while in its turn it could
be subjected in English courts to inconvenience, expense and possibly
embarrassment when some of its acts would come within one of the
exceptions that the SIA admits. The same could possibly apply to Kuwait:
it was granted immunity by the Court of Appeal in Al-Adsani on the
basis of the SIA, but if it came to the application to Kuwait to one of
the SIA’s statutory exceptions, it would be far from certain that English
courts would be conducting adjudication in accordance with the law in
force as between the UK and Kuwait; for there is no clear-cut evidence
that Kuwait consents to the international law of immunities in the shape
identical to that regulated under the SIA.
It has to be made clear that the present reasoning does not advocate
the interpretative use of Hansard the way its relevance has been admitted
in the House of Lords’ decision in Pepper v. Hart.134 It is obvious that
the legislative purpose of the SIA could not be validly identified through
this approach, for the interventions by Lords Wilberforce and Denning
do not fit within the Pepper v. Hart requirements in that they were not
presented in the capacity of the sponsor of the legislation, nor could
these interventions be used, in any straightforward manner, to identify
the ambiguity or obscurity in the terms of the Act. Their Lordships were
concerned with the overall rationale of the Act, rather than the clarity of
the meaning to be attributed to its specific provisions.
The essence of statutory construction goes precisely to the overall ratio-
nale of the SIA and to the construction of the legislator’s intention accord-
ingly. The sponsoring statement by the Lord Chancellor during theHouse
of Lords meeting on 17 January 1978 contained the observation that the
purpose of the State immunity bill was to secure immunity to sovereign
States when acting in their sovereign capacity and exclude it in rela-
tion to non-sovereign acts.135 This approach differs from and contradicts
the subsequent assertion by the Court of Appeal in Al-Adsani that the
SIA constitutes a ‘comprehensive code’ on immunities, precluding courts
from inquiring into whether the relevant act or transaction possesses the
sovereign character. There is, thus, at least the possibility to make a prima
facie case that the initial rationale behind the SIA does not completely
overlap with its subsequent use in courts.
134 Pepper v.Hart [1993] AC 593. 135 See, for the record of the meeting, above note 132.
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This approach is further supported by more specific considerations.
While the SIA has been enacted by Parliament to give domestic effect
to the ECSI, Parliament must be deemed to have been aware of the two
material considerations. Firstly, the enactment of the SIA could have the
effect of generalising the particular regime designed to apply to a few
States only. Secondly, given that the ECSI has itself acknowledged that the
general law of immunities was not being prejudiced by its special regime,
the enactment of the SIA to give effect to the ECSI could justify viewing,
for the purposes of statutory interpretation, the legislative purpose behind
the SIA as not prejudicing the applicability of the restrictive doctrine
recognised under common law and general international law.
Therefore there is a legal and judicial option that, in relation to non-
signatory States at least, the SIA can be treated as a sort of codifying
statute that reflects existing common law,136 rather than universalising an
effectively sub-regional legal framework of the ECSI. Its content could
then be applied to be somewhat reflective of the restrictive doctrine as
accepted under customary international law and correspondingly under
the pre-SIA common law in England. One example of this approach is
NML v. Argentina, which has essentially approved this vision by inter-
preting the ‘commercial exception’ under section 3 of the SIA in the light
of the broader context of the restrictive immunity doctrine. This way,
common law may provide a background that could inform the meaning
of statutory provisions to make them operate as part of the broader legal
context.137
D. The doctrine of precedent
Historically, the English common law has been premised on the two
underlying – constitutional if you wish – principles: securing the con-
tinuity and predictability of legal regulation and protecting individual
freedom. The doctrine of precedent has provided a major tool to serve
these aims. As has been sufficiently detailed above, the application of
State immunity to human rights in English (and other) courts has pro-
duced a fairly inconsistent, at times obscure, picture. Some decisions have
relied on common law while others have relied on statutory law, advanc-
ing different functional and normative justifications for immunities. This
136 Cf. Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (London: Butterworth, 1997), 465–6 (sec-
tion 212).
137 NML v. Argentina, para. 39 (per Lord Phillips).
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militates against applying the doctrine of precedent to those previous
decisions in any straightforward manner.
There are a number of options available to English courts to deal with
the previous inconsistent case-law. A superior court can select between
the two inconsistent decisions of the lower courts. For instance, the Court
of Appeal can choose which of the two conflicting High Court decisions
to apply.138 More broadly, the doctrine of precedent does not cover pre-
vious decisions reached without argument, when a superior court merely
assumes the correctness of a particular approach to the relevant legal
position without addressing and examining it, even if the proposition in
question was essential to the previous case.139 The precedential force of
Jones v. Saudi Arabia (having in its turn relied on Al-Adsani that offered
no meaningful analysis of the relevant issues) is compromised by the fact
that, as we saw above, on the two crucial issues – the scope of the acts
jure imperii and the state of customary international law on immunities –
it has not backed up its conclusions with the analysis of the evidence
or engagement of the opposite approach. This applies, a fortiori, to the
International Court’s decision in Germany v. Italy, relying on Italian con-
cessions both in relation to jure imperii acts and to the customary law
status of immunities.
In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane,140 the Court of Appeal has examined the
matter of conflicting judicial decisions, andhas, amongothers, singled out
the cases which conflict with each other and those that were delivered per
incuriam. As for the former case, it was ‘beyond question that the previous
decision is open to examination’, and ‘the court is unquestionably entitled
to choose between the two conflicting decisions’.141 More specifically:
Where the court has construed a statute or a rule having the force of a
statute its decision stands on the same footing as any other decision on a
question of law, but where the court is satisfied that an earlier decision was
given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a
statute the position is very different.142
This approach has been applied to the law of State immunity especially,
as we saw above, at the stages when the issue of State-owned ships was
138 Cf. S. H. Bailey, J. P. L. Ching andN.W. Taylor,TheModern English Legal System (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), 484–5, 493.
139 R. Cross and J. W. Harris, Precedent in English Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), 158–9, 161.
140 Young v. Bristol Aeroplane [1944] KB 718. 141 Ibid., 725, 729–30. 142 Ibid., 729.
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being addressed in the context of the then applicable absolute immu-
nity doctrine, and subsequently when English courts had to address the
transition, as a matter of English common law, from absolute towards
restrictive State immunity. In a manner somewhat at odds with Bristol
Aeroplanes, it has thus been possible to prioritise a Court of Appeal deci-
sion over a prior inconsistent House of Lords decision,143 and effectively
state the preference for the restrictive as opposed to the absolute doctrine
of immunities.
This process also demonstrates that the selection between conflicting
decisions is entirely a judicial choice, there being no binding statutory
or other regulation of this matter; and also that the duty to observe past
precedents is not as strict in relation to international legal issues as it iswith
purely domestic cases.144 As also has been demonstrated through some
detailed evidence,145 English courts are divided on several other issues
regarding the scope and customary law status of sovereign immunities.
Therefore, the issue of prioritising some and disregarding other judicial
decisions is not unlikely to arise before English courts in the future.
In future cases courts could either exclude international law (in which
case they need to find the proper English law on immunities which does
not exist, unless the SIA is used on exclusive terms); or they have to
examine anew, de novo as it were, the state of State practice and opinio
juris that would help properly ascertain the position under international
law, and then apply it as part of English law. The latter option would, on
the whole, be more suitable for reflecting the international legal position
in English law, being at the same time compatible with the ordinary
patterns in which the sources of English law operate.
The House of Lords in Jones has granted immunity to Saudi Arabia for
torture, even though the law as identified in Pinochet would not justify
this approach. In Bat, Moses LJ was not inclined to see himself bound
by the majority in Pinochet regarding the point ‘that the former Head of
State would have immunity from prosecution for murder and conspiracy
to murder in Spain’.146 Could it be argued that subsequent English cases
have upset the effect of Pinochet?
143 Cf., R. Higgins, ‘The Death Throes of Absolute Immunity: The Government of Uganda
before the English Courts’, (1979) 73AJIL, 465 at 469 (focusing, among others, onTapioca
[1974] 1 WLR 1485 and Trendtex cases).
144 As also confirmed in Trendtex.
145 R. Higgins, ‘Recent Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immunity in the United
Kingdom’, (1977) 71 AJIL, 423.
146 Khurts Bat, para. 99.
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Familiarity with the elementary principles of English common law can
easily demonstrate this is not the case. In relation to the way in which
common law operates, Lord Reid has observed inDorset Yacht that ‘when
a new point emerges [in a subsequent case], one should ask not whether
it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to it’.147
The question to be asked is whether Jones and Bat have contradicted the
principles on which the ratio decidendi in Pinochet has turned.
The reason why Jones cannot override Pinochet is that it has expressly
distinguished it and has not contradicted the principles underlying the
latter’s ratio decidendi. Both Jones and Bat are clear that they adhere to
the civil/criminal divide, and therefore show no intention to overrule
Pinochet, either on the matter of the scope of acts jure imperii, or in
relation to the effect of jus cogens. The elementary distinction between
overruling and distinguishing past cases will inevitably make it clear that
the fact that in Pinochet immunity was denied while in Jones it was upheld
is not what English common law would ordinarily place emphasis on.
Principles of law that matter for the doctrine of precedent apply not
to facts and situations involved in a particular case, but to issues that
could arise, over and over again, in multiple cases involving facts and
situations of that kind. If the subsequent court pronounces over the issue
that is different from the issue confronted on its head in the previous
case, then the subsequent case could not be reasonably seen to have
overruled that previous case. Nor could the ordinary pattern of overruling
apply to the issues of international law which, as we saw above, is created
through agreement between States, independently of English law, and
then incorporated into it, as opposed to having been created unilaterally
by courts as they do with ordinary rules of common law. All Pinochet has
done, as we saw above, was to follow the restrictive doctrine and impact
of jus cogens already accepted in international, and in common, law. It
would be plainly beyond the House of Lords’ gift in Jones to overrule this
position, even if it had an inclination to do so.
7. Conclusion
The above analysis can lead us to the conclusion that international law
relating to State immunity does not experience any fragmentation, but
merely works on the ordinary pattern of sources of law and of the hier-
archy of norms, including lex specialis and jus cogens. Immunities ratione
147 Dorset Yacht, at 1026–7 (per Lord Reid).
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materiae of States and their officials rely on a single and uniform justifi-
cation – to protect genuinely sovereign activities of States. State practice
shows no evidence that the regime applicable to immunities in civil and
criminal proceedings is different from each other. In both types of pro-
ceedings, and in the absence of any applicable treaty provision requiring
the opposite, the underlying functional test refers to acts unique to State
authority. On balance, there is no customary law obligation of one State to
accord immunity to another State, but the restrictive doctrine that aspires
to be customary law is quite narrow anyway, even as a matter of comity.
Even if one agrees that this narrow restrictive doctrine, referring to acts
unique to State authority, is part of customary law, its use in practice
would still not mandate the approach adopted in Al-Adsani, Jones and
Germany v. Italy. The absence of fragmentation is obvious at the level
of actual State practice, where the outcome obtains that State immunity
is not available for human rights violations. The imitation of the oppo-
site position in the decisions of national and international courts cannot
substantiate such a position in relation to immunities when such has not
been agreed in practice as between States.
Treaty-specific regimes can have normative impact on immunities,
requiring the denial of immunity, even if otherwise available. This con-
cerns the finding of the right balance of underlying interests as a matter of
jurisprudence of the StrasbourgCourt underArticle 6 ECHR. Both ECHR
and jus cogens clearly prevail over the immunity of States and their officials
in both criminal and civil proceedings. The adjudication standards under
ECHR and jus cogens are flexible enough, and offer reasonable ways for
balancing conflicting interests. This contrasts to the pro-immunity view
that is premised on the blanket, and thus irrational, prioritisation of the
interests of the impleaded State over that of its victims, thereby raising
legal concerns as well as reinforcing the increasing moral disrepute of this
‘traditional’ school of thought.
